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The outcome of the battle of Shiloh, as unexpected as it was disastrous threw north Mississippi into understandable panic. Soldiers on furlough, stragglers, and deserters - for desertion was already a serious problem in parts of the Confederacy - traveled over the country, forecasting another bloody battle in the almost immediate future, this one to be fought on the soil of Mississippi itself. The entire country was jittery; typical was the comment of a merchant at Ripley, which thus far had escaped actual contact with the enemy: "Things are awfully squally here. I am selling very few goods. I keep closed most of the time and have a notion to close altogether".¹

There were plenty of reasons for alarm; in fact, in all probability only the almost laughable caution of Major General H. W. Halleck, who took command of the Union army at Pittsburg Landing from Grant on April 11, saved the Confederates from disaster. The new commander succumbed to the almost universal tendency to overestimate the Confederate strength and remained on the battlefield of Shiloh until he had built his army up to 104,000 men, almost exactly double the Confederate force encamped at Corinth.² Eventually, however, he managed

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to screw up his courage and on April 30 began a movement that unquestionably must be the most timid pursuit of a defeated army in the history of warfare. Although he never encountered Confederate troops in more than outpost strength, he dug in every night and in general used the tactics of the siege rather than those of pursuit.³ Major General John Pope, who had come to Halleck's army after capturing Island No. 10 and who was a good fighter despite his tendency toward making bombastic statements at inopportune times, occassionally through his left wing ahead of the nightly entrenchments and on one occasion managed to provoke a little fight at Farmington, only four miles from Corinth.⁴ Such unseemly ambitions, however, were peremptorily squelched by Halleck and, like Major General Thomas on the right wing and Buell in the center, Pope was forced to spend most of his time digging in.

Even such a pursuit as Halleck's had to end eventually, and on May 27 the Union army, having marched a total of 22 miles in exactly four weeks, stood drawn up ready for battle north and east of the town of Corinth and its fortifications. The Federal commander, who seems to have got most of his ideas on the subject from Pope, was convinced that Beauregard was about to attack him and in General Orders of May 30 prophesied that the scene of the anticipated onslaught would be his left flank.⁵ Actually,

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on the night of May 29 - 30, hours before the General Orders were issued, Beauregard had taken his army out of the town in an evacuation that remains a masterpiece of planning and execution. But the belated knowledge that the Confederates had gone did not end Halleck's troubles, for he had not the faintest idea in which direction they had retreated. Major General W. T. Sherman reported that he had destroyed six railroad trains at Chewalla, nine miles northwest of Corinth, because Confederate engineers had mistakenly fired the bridge over the Tuscumbia River before the trains had crossed; this intelligence indicated that Beauregard might have gone toward Grand Junction or even Memphis.⁶ On the other hand, the air was filled with persistent rumors (some of which had been carefully planted by Beauregard) that the troops had gone east to Chattanooga or even Virginia. It was several days before Pope learned that the entire army was retreating at a leisurely pace down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Tupelo, fifty miles south of Corinth. He followed to Booneville and though he returned to Corinth with nothing to show for his efforts except a few stragglers who became willing captives and a few guns that had been lost on the way, he enlivened the pursuit by sending to Halleck increasingly imaginative dispatches that described such achievement as the capture of 10,000 prisoners, 15,000 stand of arms, and comparable quantities of other equipment.⁷ These glowing reports the trusting Halleck

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Beauregard himself reached Tupelo on June 7, the main part of the army on June 9. The General went on sick leave June 14 and on June 20 President Davis turned over the command to Major General Braxton Bragg. Within a month after he assumed command Bragg moved most of the army to Chattanooga, Tennessee, leaving only the armies of Major Generals Van Dorn and Price, totaling about 18,000 men, to defend the State of Mississippi.⁸

On June 6 Memphis was captured by the Federal fleet, and within a matter of days most of west Tennessee was held more or less securely by Union troops. In the meantime Halleck at Corinth was turning the town surrounding country into a veritable Gibraltar, but even while he was fortifying he began to dissipate his vast army. Buell was sent eastward along the line of the Memphis and Charleston to Chattanooga, and other detachments were scattered over four states. The only offensive movement of the Union army, if indeed it could rightfully be called one, was directed toward Holly Springs where the Confederates had equipped the iron works with machinery for the manufacture and repair of rifles. Sherman swooped down on the town from Grand Junction on June 29,⁹

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On July 11, 1862, President Lincoln gave the host of future apologists for his military genius something to ponder over by recalling Halleck from Mississippi, where he had proved that he was incapable of accomplishing anything with one army, and bringing him to Washington to take charge of all the Federal armies. On the 17th "Old Brains" took his "dim and disappearing halo" back to Washington and into the office of the Chief of Staff. Grant, who had asked to have his headquarters moved to Memphis in order to keep out of range of Halleck's righteousness, was recalled to Corinth and there took over command of the army.

Notes on Chapter I

1. O. R. Miller to T. W. Miller, April 28, 1862; letter in possession of Andrew Brown, Arlington, Va.
2. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, p. (not given)
3. Long, E. B., ed.: Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, (hereinafter cited as Grant), p. 195
4. Same, p. 196
5. Same, p. 197
6. Sherman, W. T., Memoirs of Gen. William T. Sherman, written by himself (hereinafter cited as Sherman), Vol. I, p. 256
7. Johnson, R. O., and Buel, C. C. eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (hereinafter cited as B. ∓mp;mp;mp; L.) Vol. 2, p. 721.
8. O. R., Set. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 710
9. Sherman, Vol. l, p. 257
10. Davis, Orlando, Federal Raids on Ripley, in Southern Sentinel, Ripley, Miss. Sept. 13, 20, 27, 1894 (hereinafter cited as Davis). Davis, an attorney of Ripley and one of the signers of the Mississippi Ordinance of Secession, kept a detailed diary of all Federal units that visited Ripley. He was a careful observer and gives many facts that otherwise would have been lost. His "raids" are designated by numbers, arranged chronologically; those mentioned here are raids 1 and 2.

Invasion II

May - December 1862

By Andrew Brown

Chapter II

During the first half of 1862 the war, which had been comfortably far away as the year dawned, became a near and terrifying thing to the inhabitants of Tippah County. By the end of June the Union army held Rienzi to the east, Corinth to the northeast, Bolivar to the north and Memphis to the west, and were actively patrolling most of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad just north of the Mississippi/Tennessee State line. Scouting and foraging parties in blue uniform were already common sights in parts of the county, and Ripley was beginning to pay the price of its location as a hub from which roads radiated in nearly all directions. Though the town was in a measure protected from attack from the east by the Hatchie River and the rugged Hatchie hills, it was all to accessible from other directions. The principal north-south road was the old Chickasaw trail from Bolivar to Pontotoc known north of Ripley as the Saulsbury road and south of the county seat as the New Albany or Pontotoc road. This throughfare followed the ridges between major drainage systems throughout its length, thus crossing only small streams, and was as nearly an all-weather road as any in north Mississippi at that time. Other ridge roads ran west from Ripley through Salem and Collierville and into Memphis; from Ripley north to Pocahontas, and from Ripley southeast to Fulton and Cotton Gin Port. Another road which did not follow the ridge but was widely used was the Ripley-Jacinto road, which crossed the Hatchie over the famous Hatchie Turnpike. Largely as a result of the road pattern, Ripley was the scene of almost constant military activity from about the middle of 1862 until July 1864.

On April 12, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed the first conscription law to be enacted on the American continent. Aside from the fact that the very

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principle of the law was unpopular, it was passed in secret session without any advance warning whatever, and there were numerous and vehement complaints that it was framed for the benefit of large slaveholders. As an example, owners of 20 or more slaves were exempted from military service; and as less than 50 men in Tippah owned the requisite negroes, dissatisfaction in the county was wide-spread. And to add another blow to the tottering morale of the citizens, economic conditions were deteriorating rapidly. This was due partly to the presence of large numbers of men in the army, but more to the disruption the normal trade routes brought about by the Federal occupation of Corinth, Bolivar, and Memphis. The only staple money crop was cotton, but it was impractical to sell cotton at markets within the Confederate lines because of the distances involved. And though the Federals at Memphis, then as now the principal market of the area, were anxious to obtain the staple and would pay for it in gold, the Confederate laws against trading with the enemy were harsh and, in 1862, were generally obeyed. The time was to come when these laws were honored more in the breach than in the observance, and when trading with Memphis was not only condoned, but was actually encouraged. But that was after the summer of 1862.

Already some of the necessities of life were almost unobtainable. An example was salt, which before the war had been brought in over the railroad from Virginia to Corinth, or down the rivers from Ohio to Memphis. These normal sources were out off when Union troops captured Memphis and Corinth, and the pits north of Mobile, which in later years made up some of the shortage, had not yet been put into operation. As a result the price of salt in Tupelo in June 1862 was $100.00 per sack of 100 pounds when it could be had at any price. The prices of other items, such as flour at $30.00 a barrel, bacon at $.40 a pound, and coffee at $10.00 a pound, were high but not completely prohibitive.

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As economic conditions worsened Unionist sentiment, always a factor in Tishomingo County and northwest Alabama, increased in strength in other areas. The leader of the movement was Rev. John H. Aughey, a native of New York who had lived in Mississippi before the war and married in Rienzi. Early in 1862 he moved to his wife's home and within a short time took over leadership of the "Peace Society". This group was fully organized, with a ritual of sorts and regular passwords, challenges, and answers. It operated an elaborate system for taking Union sympathizers and slaves through the Confederate lines and on occasion provided groups of vigilantes for use within Confederate territory. Its members often served as "scouts" for the Federals (the use of the more accurate descriptive term "spy" in that connection was as unforgiveable as mention of a lady's "legs would have been). The Peace Society spread from Tishomingo into Tippah and Itawamba though so far as is known there was no regular organization in those counties.¹ In Tippah the Union sentiment was concentrated largely in the northern part of the county, though there were some Federal sympathizers even in Ripley, which was remarked on many time by Federal commanders for its staunch "rebel" synpathies.²

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Few names of Union sympathizers have been handed down by either the Southern or the Northern side. No student of the was in north Mississippi, however, can fail to be impressed by the remarkably accurate information that the Federal commanders consistently received, especially in 1862 and 1863 when the entire line of the railroad from Corinth to Memphis was held by Union troops. Such a situation could only mean that the area was honeycombed with "scouts" who knew the country as only natives could.

On April 21, 1862, shortly after the passage of the Conscription Law, the Confederate Congress enacted a law authorizing the enlistment of bands of Partisan Rangers of company, battalion, or regimental strength. These Rangers were set apart from regular soldiers by the provision of Section 3 of the act: "For any arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy by any group of partisan rangers and delivered to any quartermaster at such place or places as may be designated by the commanding general, the rangers shall be paid their full value in such manner as the Secretary of War may prescribe." Under this provision the rangers were placed in much the same dubious category on land as that occupied by privateers at sea; and whether the Congress realized it or not, passage of the law placed the Government dangerously close to giving overt authorization to guerrilla warfare. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation may have been, the Federal government and its commanders in the field not unnaturally placed the worst interpretation upon the activities of the Rangers; and the enlistment of large numbers of such organizations in north Mississippi in the summer and fall of 1862 unquestionably was responsible in part for the harsh tactics pursued by some of the Union officers during that period.

Notes on Chapter 2

1. Aughey, John H., Tupelo, State Journal Co., Lincoln, Nebr., 1888, p. 91. The style of Aughey's book leaves the impression that he is exaggerating many of the things he states as facts, but there is no doubt that he knew the country well and that he exercised a good deal of power. According to his own account he was captured and sentenced to be shot by Bragg, but escaped. In 1863 he went to the Army of the Potomac, where he served as a chaplain for the rest of the war.
2. A manuscript map in the National Archives, made in 1862 for General Rosecrans and mentioned by Grant in his Memoirs, marks an area in northern Tippah County "Union Territory". (Records of the office of the Chief of Engineers, Headquarters map file, Map No. 85.).

Invasion III

May - December 1862
By Andrew Brown

Chapter III

On January 3, 1862, Colonel William C. Falkner of the Second Mississippi Infantry, from his winter quarters near Dumfries, Virginia, wrote a long letter to Adjutant-General Cooper.¹ Under the latest act for the reorganization of the Army his regiment was to be reorganized and taken into the Army of the Confederate States, instead of the Provisional Army of that nation; and, after the reorganization and re-enlistment were complete, it would hold a new election of officers. Although it was hardly in the Falkner nature to admit that he had become something of a martinet who gloried in much "fuss and feathers"² and was becoming increasingly unpopular for that reason, he yet realized that he was in an unfavorable situation as far as re-election to the colonelcy was concerned, he therefore set about to prepare a soft place into which he could fall in case of defeat.

He first explained his positions: "The President is well aware of the fact that an officer who manages volunteers according to that discipline that is absolutely necessary to make them effective is not likely to stand much chance of

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re-election when opposed by someone who premises to let the men do as he (sic.) pleases, this being the case with myself . . . " If the last phrase is a little obscure, it may be hoped that the Adjutant-General and the President understood that Falkner intended to say that he, Falkner, was the strict disciplinarian, not the candidate who promised to let the men do as they pleased. The author then asked several questions about the mechanics of the reorganization before coming, to the real purpose of the letter, which was to ask for a commission in the Confederate instead of the Mississippi Army. He mentioned that he had been highly recommended by his immediate superior, Major General W. H. C. Whiting, and by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.³ He did not name the rank he desired and probably at that time would have been satisfied with a colonelcy.

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After waiting a decent time for a reply to his letter and receiving none, Falkner shifted his attack. Far from giving up the fight, he raised his sights and began a campaign for a brigadier-generalship. He made a quick trip to Mississippi (Vairin) and in March 1862 a number of letters from military men in that state, furthering the new objective, descended upon the Secretary of War. Gen. Charles Clark wrote a polite if hardly more than routine recommendation; Gen. James R. Chalmers stated carefully that Falkner bore the reputation of being a good officer but that he, Chalmers, had no first-hand knowledge of his qualifications; this statement had later repercussions.

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Gen. T. C. Hindman wrote, "Col. Falkner is brave, energetic, and temperate, and I consider him well qualified for the position". In view of the past difficulties between Falkner and the Hindman family this recommendation is little short of amazing. Daniel B. Wright, one of the signers of the Mississippi Ordinance and later Lieutenant Colonel of the 34th Mississippi, wrote, "I have just finished a canvass in the northern part of the State for the purpose of raising troops for the war and the desire is general if not universal to serve under Col. Falkner as Brigadier General".⁴

As he had feared, Falkner was defeated for re-election and was succeeded as Colonel on April 23 by John M. Stone of Iuka, former captain of Co. K. The margin of Stone's victory was only 13 votes, which did nothing to assuage Falkner's wounded pride. He made some bitter references to "a combination of demagogues against me"⁵ and in general took his defeat in bad part. To add to his to his woes, his application for promotion was gathering dust in the files. There is nothing in the record to show that it was ever disapproved; apparently it was simply ignored. Whatever the reasons for the Administrations failure to act have been, they were not spread on the record.⁶ At last, realizing that he was

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Despite the unwillingness of the Second Mississippi to re-elect him as its Colonel, and despite the persistence of the Richmond administration in ignoring him pleas for promotion, Falkner returned to his home county very much of a hero and something of a martyr. During his first month in Mississippi he traveled quite a bit, and it is certain that he watched with interest the increasingly bitter struggle between the Confederate authorities and

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Governor Pettus, who appeared determined to build up the strength of the State even at the expense of that of the Confederacy. And while he watched he was undoubtedly deciding on his next step. Smarting under what he considered unjust treatment in Virginia, he was more determined than ever to make a name for himself; and as Macbeth himself was not driven by a stronger ambition than that which thrust William C. Falkner forward, it was essential that whatever he did must be done on a large, even grandiose, scale. It soon became apparent that the path leading to the greatest glory which, in Falkner's case, meant raising and commanding the largest number of troops, was marked plainly by the provisions of the recently enacted Partisan Ranger law. The Ranger service offered a rare combination of popular features - cavalry rather than infantry service, the possibility of what might charitably be called legitimate plunder, and a relative freedom from the more onerous restrictions of army and camp life. It did not take Falkner long to realize that it would be easier, in north Mississippi, to raise a regiment of Partisan Rangers than it would to enroll a battalion of regular army troops; and he bided his time until a favorable opportunity should arise.

He did not have long to wait. On June 29 the town of Ripley saw its first Union soldiers, the advance guard of Rosecrans' ineffectual advance from Corinth toward Holly Springs. Falkner, Judge C. A. Green, and W. T. Stricklin, former Adjutant of the 23rd Mississippi, narrowly escaped capture at the county seat and were pursued by the Federal troopers to within four miles of New Albany. As soon as he was safe from pursuit Strickland dispatched a note to Gen. J. R. Chalmers at Tupelo, which probably was responsible for the Confederate move toward Ripley that sent Rosecrans scurrying

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Stricklin's letter stated that the first Federal soldiers to enter Ripley told the citizens that it was their intention to occupy the town permanently. Why they did not do so is one of the war's many mysteries, unless it be assumed that Halleck at that time contemplated taking a strictly defensive attitude around Corinth. Ripley's location, and particularly the network of roads that radiated from it, would have made it an ideal outpost from which to protect the Memphis and Charleston railroad. But that speculation is beside the point. The important thing, from Falkner's viewpoint, was that the citizens of Tippah had seen the enemy at close range; and the war, instead of being an uncomfortable but distant thing, had moved to their very doorsteps. Such a situation spurred men to enlist in the army, an urge that was further augmented by the recently enacted Conscription law. Falkner, who was no mean spellbinder, took full advantage of the situation. Before the month of July had well started he had 115 men under arms¹⁰ and more were enlisting daily. Major General Sterling Price was prevailed on to give Falkner the necessary recommendation to the War Department for authority to recruit a regiment of Partisan Rangers; as, strictly speaking, Price was not authorized to do so, that fact was to cause Falkner trouble later.¹¹

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Falkner planned to muster his regiment about the first of August. A few days before the activation was to take place Brigadier General P. H. Sheridan, in charge of the Federal outpost at Rienzi, learned that about 600 men of the new organization were camped near Ripley and sent the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, Colonel A.L. Lee, and the Second Iowa Cavalry, Colonel Edward Hatch, to break it up. The Federal soldiers surrounded Ripley about 8 AM on July 28; The Second Iowa then went to Ellis' Farm,¹² the reported campground, while the Seventh Kansas remained in town. Falkner was warned in time, however, and the men escaped toward Salem with trifling losses. Sheridan's report of the raid follows:

On this trip to Ripley the Federals did not molest any private citizens except Judge Thompson and Dick Ford, publisher of the Advertiser. They failed

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Despite the best efforts of Hatch and Lee, Falkner's regiment was mustered into Confederate service as the First Mississippi Partisan Rangers on August 1. A majority of the officers and men were residents of Tippah, though there can be little doubt that some of the men had come into the county to escape the Conscription Law or for other purposes. In Company K, however, all of the officers and about half the men were from Kossuth, Tishomingo County.¹⁶ The captains of the various companies at organization were Co. A., Wm. L. Davis (Thos. Ford after Sept. 2, 1862); Co. B., Lawson B. Hovis (H. T. Counseille after Sept. 2, 1862); Co. C, Forney Green; Co. D, Philip Holcombe; Co. E, J. E. Rogers (Willis Stansell after Sept. 1, 1862); Co. F, W. M. Garrett; Co. G, John Garrett; Co. H, J. M. Park; Co. I, Larkin McKinza; Co. K, W. C. Gamble. The changes in

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On August 7 Falkner wrote to Adjutant-General Snead for instructions. It is possible to detect a figurative gleam in his eye as he mentioned, in a question regarding the treatment to be given to Union sympathizers, that certain men of that persuasion in the northern part of the county "had some mighty fine horses.¹⁸ Snead answered that he was to conciliate all Union men except those actually helping the enemy; those were to be arrested and placed under guard, but

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Soon after its organization the Rangers were ordered to Chewalla, just north of the state line and about 12 miles west of Corinth, for scouting duty.²⁰ A few days later Major General Gordon Graner, commanding Grant's cavalry, reported that Falkner had left Ripley with eleven companies,²¹ traveling mostly at night and and away from roads and had captured seven stragglers near Corinth. He then turned south and surprised and routed the Union cavalry pickets three miles west of Rienzi by sending Lieutenent Colonel Hovis with three companies to attack the rear of the picket Line while Falkner, with the other companies, charged it from the front.²² The pickets retired on the main camp at Rienzi, where two

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battalions each of the Second Iowa and Seventh Kansas were drawn up quickly with the Third Michigan in reserve; the remainder of the brigade was at that time on a reconnoitering expedition toward Tupelo. The Union forces counter-attacked and after a short time the Rangers withdrew westward, making stands three miles out, then six miles out, and finally at Nowland's store (SW ¼, 3-4-6) on the divide between the Hatchie and Tombigbee drainages. At Nowland's Falkner drew up 250 to 300 men in line of battle and awaited the Federal charge. When at the first onslaught the Rangers showed signs of panic, Captain McKinza of Co. I attempted to stem the tide by holding his pistol high above his head and threatening to shoot the first man who ran.²³ His efforts failed, however; the Rangers retreated across the Hatchie and were pursued by the Federal troops to within five miles of Ripley.

Falkner's report of the skirmish at Rienzi, if he made one, has been lost. Sheridan reported to Granger that his brigade lost two badly and four slightly wounded and four or five missing some of whom would come in. He makes no mention of Confederate casualties beyond saying that "unfortunately" eleven prisoners were brought in.²⁴ He regarded the troops opposing him, except three companies, as raw levies, and in describing the battle in later years wrote that Falkner escaped by a side road but left the Federals his hat, as did most of his command; that the union soldiers came back from the pursuit loaded with hats, haversacks, blankets, and other equipment, and that 200 shotguns, 20 horses,

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Granger's orders that no prisoners were to be taken reflects the attitude of the Federal leaders toward the Rangers, whom they regarded as guerrillas not entitled to the rights of soldiers. It must be admitted that the Union soldiers in north Mississippi and west Tennessee had suffered to some extent from the activities of private citizens who could not resist the temptation to indulge in a little sniping whenever they saw a blue coat; Granger himself had reported to Grant that "every man in the country who has a gun is a guerrilla operating against us."²⁶ Granger was not however, the type of man likely to differentiate between out-and-out guerrillas and farmers who used their guns to protect their property or their lives. As to Falkner's regiment, it suffered more from the association of the Ranger name with bushwhacking activities than from its own

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On August 30 Falkner reported to Brigadier General Little of Price's army²⁷ and on September 14 accompanied Little to Iuka, which the Confederates occupied without molestation. Grant and Rosecrans, however, divined that Price intended to use the town as a springboard for a dash across the Tennessee River to Join Bragg's army in Tennessee, and attempted to crush Price between the armies of Major General E. O. C. Ord, who was to advance southeast from Burnsville to Iuka, and of Rosecrans, who was who was to come northeast from Jacinto. On the morning of the 19th Rosecrans began his advance, following the Jacinto-Tuscumbia road eastward to Barnett's Corners²⁸ then turning north toward Iuka. His advance was well screened by cavalry, one regiment of which, the Second Iowa under Colonel Hatch, swung south to Peytons Mill, where the Iuka-Fulton road crossed Mackeys Creek.²⁹

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About two miles from the mill Hatch encountered pickets of Falkner's regiment, who retired on the main body drawn up on the east side of Mackey's Creek. Hatch attacked the Rangers about noon and according to his own report routed them in twenty minutes, they leaving three dead, two mortally wounded, and two prisoners on the field. He also reported that he captured Falkner's order book.³⁰ Falkner's account disagrees with the Hatch version; it says that the Rangers were attacked near the mill by about 1,000 of the enemy who were deployed as skirmishers, and that "a little confusion ensued". After about half an hour's firing the Confederates charged and drove the Federals across the creek, where they reformed in a position too strong to be assaulted. Falkner then retired toward Thompson's Corners, a few miles east of Barnett's Corners, and then fell back on the main body at Iuka. He reported that his losses were one lieutenant, one sergeant, and three men killed, and ten men wounded; that he saved all his baggage and killed "a goodly number" of the enemy; and that with few exceptions his men behaved well.³¹

Though Hatch claimed a victory at Peytons Mill, the fact is that Falkner, in falling back toward his main body, was doing what any such outpost would be expected to do under the circumstances; he had done his part in feeling out and delaying the enemy, and the record of the Rangers in the

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At 4 PM, four hours after the Peytons Mill skirmish, Rosecrans' army attacked Price at his position about a mile south of Iuka. Because of freakish wind conditions Grant and Ord at Burnsville did not hear the firing and therefore did not move up their arm of the intended pincers and Price retained possession of the battlefield. But in the meantime Van Dorn had countermanded Price's projected dash into Tennessee and recalled him to join in an attack on Corinth. Accordingly on the 20th Price retreated southward to Bay Springs and then turned westward through Baldwyn to Ripley where his troops and those of Van Dorn were combined for the Corinth attack. There is no record of the part of the First Partisan Rangers in the retreat from Iuka, but the Federal reports speak of the excellent protection given the main body by the cavalry rearguard and it is fair to infer that the Rangers had a part in maintaining that screen.

During the Corinth campaign the Rangers were sent north of the town to cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad with the objective of preventing reinforcements from coming into Corinth by rail from Jackson. Falkner made no report of his activities in that connection, and the only Federal account is that of Captain McCauley of the 17th Wisconsin who claimed that he drove off an attacking

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party at Ramer, after one rail had been removed, he said that a native told him that the Confederates were Falkner's cavalry, under Falkner himself. McCauley claimed a sizable victory, saying that the Confederates left on the ground seven sabers, five guns, eight or ten bloody coats, and 30 or 40 caps and hats; and that he found insignia of seven companies. The reference to the bloody coats leads to the inference that the attackers had been in action elsewhere, and whatever may have been the Rangers' success or lack of it at Ramer, the fact remains that the railroad was cut successfully by the Cenfederates. When McPherson's division was sent to Corinth to reinforce Rosecrans it was forced to leave the cars at Bethel, 15 miles north of Corinth, and march over bad roads the rest of the way.³² The delay entailed by that march unquestionably hindered Rosecrans' pursuit of Van Dorn's defeated army.

The affair at Ramer was the last reported contact of the First Partisan Rangers with the Yankees in 1862. They were soon, however, to come into conflict with an enemy that did them far more damage than the men in blue uniforms. That foe was the Confederate Conscription Bureau, which became suddenly energetic in Mississippi in the fall of 1862.

Soon after the battle of Corinth, on October 12, Van Dorn was succeeded as commander of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana by J. C. Pemberton, who had been hurriedly promoted to Lieutenant General and transferred from South Carolina. Pemberton tried to bring some semblance of order into the military affairs of the state, which had fallen into chaos because of setbacks in battle and the constant bickering between the State and the Confederate authorities. Among other things, he attempted to get the Conscription Bureau into effective operation. Throughout the summer of 1862 that organization had been making efforts

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Realizing that in the Partisan Ranger law the War Department had a tiger by the ears, the Government attempted to contain the enlistment of rangers almost as soon as it had passed the Ranger law. An early step was General Order 53, dated July 31, 1862, which provided that men joining the Ranger companies must be more than 35 years of age and not subject to conscription. Later, after complaints in Mississippi became widespread, General Pemberton sent Lt. Col. W. N. Brown of the 20th Mississippi Infantry into north Mississippi to inspect the numerous unattached companies of cavalry and Rangers with a view toward combining them into battalions or regiments. Brown's reports dated October 7, states that he was repeatedly questioned as to how the Rangers were to be paid for the munitions they captured, but was forced to reply that up to that time the Secretary of War had made no regulations governing the matter.³³ He added rather emphatically that he had "not found any authority for the retention of property by Rangers as claimed by some nor for the impressment of property belonging to men said to be Union sympathizers, of which some complaint is being made of the Ranger Service".

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By the middle of October the Rangers were under fire from many quarters. The Conscription Bureau at Brookhaven was bringing very few men into the army, and blamed its failure on the ranger companies which, it claimed, were serving as refuges for men subject to conscription. Finally on October 29 the head of the Bureau, Major Clark, wrote to the Secretary of War: "I am making every effort to get conscripts and forward them without delay. I am annoyed very much by the partisan rangers. They are doing little or no service and are complained of by the whole community as well as the army. I desire that you give me a positive order to take conscripts from all partisan rangers that have joined prior to the 31^st of July, except those companies designated by the request of Governor Pettus, and please word the order to that effect.³⁴

Major Clark got his order. It did not apply directly to Falkner's regiment, which had been mustered in on the first day of August; but G. O. 53, dated fatefully enough, on July 31, specifically made all men in Ranger companies under 35 years of years of age subject to conscription, and that took care of most of Falkner's force. Further, the Conscription officers pounced on the fact that General Price, who had recommended that Falkner be granted authority to organize the regiment, was not a department commander and therefore lacked authority to give the recommendation. Accordingly, about the middle of November, they descended upon Tippah and attempted to conscript all of Falkner's men who were not exempt. Thereupon the regiment simply disintegrated, the men fleeing in all directions.³⁵ The

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Viewed in the cold perspective of' history there can be little doubt that the breaking up of Falkner's regiment by the Conscription Bureau was a Pyrrhic victory for the Confederacy. There can be no doubt that a considerable number of enlistments in the Rangers.were made for the purpose of evading the conscription law; nor can it be denied that Falkner enlisted his men as Rangers instead of regular cavalry or infantry because only in that way could he have hoped to raise a body of regimental size. On the other hand, his achievement in raising within one or two months a regiment of 700 men, mostly from a county with a white population of 16,000 that had already sent 1,300 to 1,500 men into the Confederate service, was outstanding. That is true even though it must be admitted that he used the Conscription law as a club, and that he may have used at this time, as he did later, his powers of arrest to bring in recruits. Whatever Falkner's faults may have been - and he had grievous faults - there was some quality about him that

Invasion III

But even more commendable than Falkner's recruiting off his regiment was his use of it. At a time when independent companies were mushrooming all over the State, many with no more serious purpose than to give the organizer a captain's commission, and when the authorities were sending out men to try to combine these scattered groups into effective organizations, Falkner enlisted his men as a regiment - the only body of partisan rangers in the State that was recruited as such.³⁷ He incorporated them as far as practicable into the regular army organization and in general handled them and taught them to think of themselves as regular army troops. If they did not show to advantage against Sheridan at Rienzi, they did an adequate job at Peyton's Mill, and in general they had no reason to be ashamed of their record. The men, green, inexperienced, and poorly armed as they were, were pitted against veteran Union cavalrymen led by such man as Granger, Sheridan, and Hatch, easily the pick of the federal cavalry leaders in the west. These men had a sort of grudging respect for Falkner; even the tough Sheridan after the fight at Rienzi gave the "hard core" of the regiment a left-handed compliment by exempting three of the ten companies from his classification of "raw recruits". Whether the First Mississippi Partisan Rangers could ever have been welded into a really efficient organization is a moot point; its colonel was throughout his life a better starter than finisher, and there was an element of instability in the regiment itself, stemming from

Invasion III

weaknesses inherent in the ranger concept. But Falkner started well, and the wise course would certainly have been to ignore technicalities and make the best of the situation. But the Conscription Bureau was obdurate, and as a result the Confederacy lost the services of a regiment that at least had good potentialities, set back the career of a colonel who apparently had profited from his past mistakes and was on the way to becoming a useful officer, and most important, did not get the recruits it broke up the regiment to obtain. There are a lot of good hiding places in the Hatchie hills, and most of them were in continuous use during the winter of 1862-1863.

Notes on Chapter 3

1. W. C. Falkner to S. A. Cooper, Jan. 3, 1862: A. G. 0., Service record of W. C. Falkner.
2. A case in point is an elaborate church formation devised by Falkner, for marching the men to religious services, which was so much resented by them that the chaplain prevailed upon him to discontinue it. Also his interest in the band (see Bondurant, A. L., William C. Falkner, Novelist in Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Vol. III, pp. 113-125, hereinafter cited as Bondurant) though doubtless well intentioned, was carried to the point where it was felt that the colonel was infringing on the organization's prerogatives.
3. No written recommendation from either Whiting or Johnston dating from this period has been found in the records. Bondurant (op. cit) quotes a letter written by Johnston on the day Falkner was succeeded by John. M. Stone as colonel, which reads:

Lee's farm

April 23, 1862

Sir:

I take the liberty of offering my testimony in behalf of Col. Falkner, late of the 2nd Mississippi regiment. This gentleman has served with me in command of that admirable regiment for the past eleven months. Its discipline and instruction during all that time prove his zeal and capacity as his courage was proved on the field of Manassas. I regret very much to lose him. If he can be replaced in the army in a position adequate to his merit be assured that it will be fortunate for the service as well as the efficiency of the troops under his command.

Most respectfully,

Your obt sert,

J.E. Johnston, Gen'l.

The Hon. J. W. Randolph,
Secretary of War

Bonderant states that this letter was in the possession of Hon. J. W. T. Falkner; a son of the colonel. Apparently Falkner carried it with him and there is no proof that it ever got to the Secretary of War. He also quotes from a letter from General Whiting, date not given, "...He has been defeated by demagogues and affords another illustration of the crying evils that the elective system in the army is producing"; the location of this letter is not given. He also quotes Special Orders 98, dated April 22, 1862, which praises Falkner upon his retirement. This order was the accepted form of recognition given any officer who retired under honorable circumstances, and beyond that has no meaning whatever. But, after quoting the order, Bondurant let his imagination run wild and wrote that Whiting had read to the brigade "a commendation recounting not only Falkners achievements in the present war but those in the War with Mexico". Aside from the fact that Falkner's "achievements" in the war with Mexico were of a highly dubious nature and that there were plenty of men in the 2nd and other north Mississippi regiments who knew it, it is hard to imagine Whiting's doing anything more than courtesy called for, the reading of Special Orders 98.

It is not pleasant to be forced to attack the legend of greatness that has been built up around Falkner, but if the truth is to be known and especially if others involved are to be treated fairly, it is essential that attention be called to the errors in Bondurant's article, which includes most of the basic data of the Falkner legend and which has been widely copied, directly and indirectly. The article, in addition to being partisan - his ranking of Falkner as a novelist, for example, is almost laughable - is demonstrably inaccurate in a number of details besides that mentioned above. Among the more glaring inaccuracies are:

1. The statement that Beauregard asked, as Falkner rode by at Manassas, "Who is yon knight with the black plums? Men, you may follow where he leads". The first traceable appearance of this story is in an article in a Memphis newspaper, published by Col. M. C. Galloway; it vas picked up later by Boadurant, and also crept into the Confederate Military History (Evans, C.A., Ed., Confederate Military History, Vol. VII, Mississippi and Alabama, p. 23), and much later was picked up by Life Vol. No. , p. Sept. 26, 1953. Admitting that Beauregard would have been likely to make just such a remark on the slightest provocation, it is hardly likely that, had he been so impressed as it would indicate, the General would have failed to mention Falkner's name in either his voluminous official report of the battle, his later articles written for "Battles and Leaders", or his ghost-written biography. Yet the name of Falkner does not appear in any of these documents. General Johnston, in his official report of the battle names Falkner and ten other colonels whose conduct he considered commendable. His "Narrative", written later in life, does not mention Falkner.

2. The statement attributed to the dying General Bee, that he "longed to live long enough to tell of Falkner's bravery". The time and circumstance of Bee's wounding and death make it extremely improbable that he could made such a statement.

3. The statement that Falkner commanded a brigade after the battle of Manassas. He did command the brigade after taken over by Bee, in the Shenandoah for a few days in June, before Bee arrived. He never afterward commanded a brigade in Virginia, though he did act as brigade commander under Chalmers in Mississippi in March 1863.

4. The story that at the first battle of Manassas Falkner volunteered to take, and did take "four guns of Sherman's battery" that had advanced toward the Henry House Hill. This can refer only to the eleven (not four guns moved toward the Confederate lines by Captains Ricketts and Griffin (not by Sherman). The battery was captured by the 33rd Virginia of Jackson's brigade (see Freeman, D. S., Lee's Lieutenants, Vol. 1, p. 69). At the time Ricketts and Griffin made their move Falkner was reforming behind Jackson and could not have reached the battery except by going through Jackson's line, which was out of the question under the circumstances. It is interesting to note that after the war several regiments claimed to have captured the battery, and the Seventh Georgia actually has a marker at the site to commemorate the event. Freeman's statement, however, may be accepted as correct.

With all the exaggerated accounts of Falkner's prowess at Manassas it is somewhat surprising that the highest tribute to him that is to be found in the Official Records has been overlooked. That was the official report of J.E.B. Stuart whose cavalry charge in the afternoon was the turning point of the battle. Stuart said (O. R. Ser. I, Vol. II, p. 473) that joining in the charge was "Falkner's regiment (Mississippians), whose gallantry came under my personal observation". It should be emphasized also that despite the doubtful authenticity of Beauregard's "black plume" remark and despite the exploded claim that the Second Mississippi had anything to do with the capture of Rickett's guns, the regiment's part in the early phases of the battle was highly creditable. It, as part of the forces of Bee, Bartow and Evans, helped to hold back the first Federal attack until the remainder of the army could form, and for its work in that part of the battle probably deserves more credit than it has received.

4. The letters here referred to are in A. G. O., service record of William C. Falkner.

5. Falkner to James Phelan, Senator from Mississippi, Feb. 7, 1863; A. G. O., service record of W. C. Falkner.

6. A possible explanation may be an alleged shortage in his accounts. For the purpose of paying bounties to men re-enlisting under the law of January, 1862, Falkner drew $26,400 between January and April 1862; his receipts for the money are in his service record (A. G. O.) On December 1, 1862, after Falkner had returned to Mississippi, the Auditor's office sent him a bill for $14,850, alleging that his records showed that he had disbursed only $11,550 of the amount drawn and was indebted to the Government for the balance. There is no record that Falkner ever received this statement, or that any further efforts were made to collect the amount alleged to be due. Unless further information bearing on it should come to light, too much attention should not be paid to this shortage, if indeed it was an actual shortage.

7. Falkner to Phelan, op. cit.

8. W.C. Falkner to Jefferson Davis May 12, 1862, A. G. O., Service record of W. C. Falkner.

9. W.T. Stricklin to Gen. Chalmers, June 30, 1862 "9 o'clock AM"; A. G. O., service record of W. T. Stricklin. See also Davis, raid 2.

10. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 710

11. The Partisan Ranger Act provided that only Department Commanders were authorized to make the recommendations. Thus, in Mississippi, the authority could be given only by Beauregard before June 17, and Bragg after that date.

12. Ellis farm was four miles west of Ripley, and 1 1/2 miles east of Shady Grove, on the Antioch road in Sec. 7, T4S, R3E.

13. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 132, July 29, 1862.

Sheridan went to Rienzi as Colonel of the Third Michigan shortly after the Federal occupation of Corinth. He was promoted brigadier general after a victory over Chalmers cavalry on July 1, at Booneville. He left for the eastern theater in September 1862. Before he left Rienzi, however, he was presented with a black horse with three white feet by his successor as Colonel of the Third Michigan. This animal, originally named "Rienzi" and later "Winchester", carried the general on his famous ride from Winchester, Virginia, to the battle of Cedar Creek in 1864.

Sheridan in his Memoirs states clearly that "Rienzi" or "Winchester" was a black horse, and all the paintings of the famous ride so picture him. It is therefore somewhat surprising to find that the horse displayed in the National Museum at Washington, labeled "Rienzi" and carry Sheridan's saddle and accouterments, is a roan!

14. Davis, 3

15. Sheridan, Philip H., Personal Memoirs of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, New York, 1888, vol. I, p. 168.

16. C.M.R., copy of Historical roster of Co. K, First Mississippi Partisan Rangers, with muster rolls and rosters of 7th Mississippi cavalry. The original of the Historical Roster is in the Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss.

17. C.M.R., Muster rolls and rosters of 7th Mississippi Cavalry (the later designation of the First Mississippi Partisan Rangers), File . Later entries on the roster are: Forney Green, Capt. Co. C, wounded in action prior to Nov. 29, 1862, succeeded on that date by B.W. Dickson; Green died of wounds Jan. 1, 1863; Philip Holcombe, Co. D, relieved by Col. Falkner Jan. l, 1863; succeeded by Absalom White, later by P. M. Marmon, and after July I, 1863, by Michael Mauney; dates of Marmon's and White's tenures not given; J. K. Guyton appears as captain of Co. E, but dates not given; Capt. Park, Co. H, promoted Major Feb. 8, 1863, succeeded by Charles N. Wheeler, listed as captured, no date given; W. L. Duncan shown as succeeding Capt. Garrett, Co. F, but dates not given; Capt. McKinza, Co. I, resigned Nov. 15, 1862, succeeded March 7, 1863, by William Young.

18. A.G.O., service record of W. C. Falkner.

19. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 668

20. Same, p. 682

21. Same. Assuming that Granger was correct as to the eleven companies - and the Federal intelligence at that time and in that area was marvelously accurate - the odd company was probably one organized at Ripley on August 11 with W. W. McDowell as Captain, Jeff J. Davis as First Lieutenant, and Andrew B. Knox as Second Lieutenant. This company was later incorporated into Ballentine's regiment of cavalry as Co. E. (See CMR muster rolls and rosters of Ballentine's regiment).

22. Southern Sentinel, Ripley Miss., Aug. 9, 1906, letter from W. W. Bailey, Adjutant of the Rangers. Bailey wrote that Falkner camped at Ripley the night before the attack and launched his raid from that town. It is probable, however, that Bailey's memory was at fault. The Federals watched the few crossings of the Hatchie closely, and kept a picket line from Bay Springs, southeast of Rienzi, to Ruckersville. Under these conditions it is hardly likely that a force as large as a regiment could have crossed the Hatchie and got to within three miles of Rienzi without being detected.

23. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. I, pp. 39-41. The story about Captain McKinza is in Bailey's letter in the Sentinel, above mentioned.

24. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. I, p. 42

25. Same: Also Sheridan, Vol. 1, pp. 175-177. The "local color" in this account is not found in Sheridan's official reports in O. R.; and as none of Sheridan's accomplishments shrank in Sheridan's telling of them, it is possible that he exaggerated the panic of the Rangers.

26. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. L, p. 39

27. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 690

28. Barnett's corners was not far west of the present intersection of Mississippi routes 25 and 364. It was the intersection of the Jacinto-Tuscumbia and Iuka-Fulton roads.

29. Peytons Mill was about a mile south of the present town of Paden, in sec. 17, T. 5 S., R. 10 E. It was later known as Burnt Mill. The correct spelling of the name was "Paden" rather than Peyton; but as reports of both sides use the second spelling, it is retained here. The mill was about 6 miles south of Barnetts Corners.

30. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. I, pp 69, 138. Hatch said that Falkner's order book showed 45 men present for duty, obviously an error. The actual number was probably around 450.

31. Same, p. 138

32. O.R.

33. C.M.R., Muster rolls and rosters of Ballentine's cavalry regiment

34. O.R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 149

35. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. II, p. 539

36. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. I, p. 490. Hovis and the other captives probably escaped while Lee was chasing Falkner, as there is no record of their imprisonment at this time.

37. At least one other regiment, the second Rangers or Smith's regiment, was formed later from scattered companies and other organizations were formed in part from Ranger companies. Ballentine's cavalry, regiment, for example, was formed from three companies of state troops and seven ranger companies.

Invasion IV

May - December 1862

By Andrew Brown

Chapter IV

While Colonel Falkner was recruiting his Partisan Rangers and while the tug-of-war between the State, the Rangers, and the Conscription Bureau was moving toward its explosive climax, events that were to shape the whole course of the war were taking place along the Tennessee-Mississippi State line. After taking command of the western armies from Halleck in July 1862 Grant disposed his forces in positions from which he could defend west Tennessee and at the same time begin the attack on Vicksburg which was always in the back of his restless mind. By the first of September he had 23,000 men under Rosecrans at Corinth and its outpost positions; a sizeable force strung out along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Bethel to Jackson and along the Mississippi Central Railroad from Jackson to Bolivar with an out post at Grand Junction, all under Ord; and Sherman's army at Memphis with an outpost at Brownsville. The entire force numbered about 50,000 men, less than half of the magnificent army hat Halleck had led from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth in May.¹

The Confederate forces in Mississippi comprised the armies of Van Dorn, numbering about 8,000 men, and Price, numbering about 14,000. There seems to have been poor coordination between Bragg, who commanded the Western States, Van Dorn who commanded in Mississippi, and Price; this situation, joined with poor intelligence of the enemy's movements, was responsible for much of the ill fortune that dogged the Confederates in the fall of 1862. As an example, Price took his army to Iuka and planned to take it

Invasion IV

into Tennessee largely on the basis of a completely false report that Rosecrans had evacuated Corinth and was himself moving toward Nashville. In defending against Price's move, Grant shifted most of the Corinth garrison and part of the Jackson troops eastward and left Corinth relatively unprotected. In such a situation it might have been possible for Van Dora to move against Corinth from the south while Price was holding much of the Federal force at Iuka, but instead of utilizing that opportunity, Van Dorn ordered Price to meet him at Ripley, from which town the combined armies marched against Corinth by way of Pocahontas, with the idea of keeping Grant in the dark as to the point against which the blow would fall. Reflection shows that such a move was useless, as Grant knew full well that Corinth, with its railroads and its vast supplies, would be most useful to the Confederates, whereas the other possible point of attack, Bolivar, contained no such rich prizes. But regardless of the flaw in Van Dorn's reasoning, his and Price's armies lay encamped in and around Ripley from September 28 until October l, "sweeping everything there was to eat that could be bought for love or money, cornfields and cribs, potato houses and gardens, meat houses and pantries suffered to the last point of endurance".² During this

Invasion IV

On October 1 the Confederates marched north toward Pocahontas. They encountered Rosecrans' cavalry outposts at Ruckersville and according to the Federal report lost 50 privates, one captain, and one chaplain by capture; as the Union troops had no way to take care of the prisoners, they were paroled.⁴ The army continued north through Jonesboro to the little settlement of Metamora, situated on a bluff west of the Hatchie River bottom at the intersection of the Ripley-Pocahontas road with the old Tennessee State line road⁵ about two miles south of Pocahontas. Sending a detachment north to take and hold Pocahontas, the main body turned east and crossed the Hatchie River at Davis Bridge on the State Line Road and on the night of October 2 camped at Chewalla. On the 3rd and 4^th they made a dashing attack on Corinth and some units penetrated the defenses; but after bitter and sanguinary fighting were forced to fall back. Van Dorn retreated

Invasion IV

Once across the Hatchie, the Confederates continued their retreat through Jonesboro and Ruckersville to Ripley. The advance guard reached the town about 1 AM on Monday morning, October 7; and by dawn the town was full of soldiers, some wounded, all hungry or famished, and all begging for something to eat.⁷ There was some apprehension that Van Dorn might make a stand at Ripley and the town was panic-stricken until the general himself arrived and assured the people that he intended to retreat further west and that therefore there was little prospect of a fight at Ripley. The army continued to pass through the town on the 7th and 8th, the Federal advance guard following about midnight of the 8th. In this unit was the Seventh Kansas Cavalry under Col. Lee which had been in Ripley before but which had not, on that occasion molested private citizens. This time, however, Colonel Lee mustered the regiment in front of Spight's Hotel and dismissed is saying, "Boys do as you please". They sacked the hotel, taking spoons, knives, and forks, blankets, quilts, bacon, flour, salt, corn, fodder, and everything else they could lay their hands on. They broke into

Invasion IV

By the time Rosecrans himself reached Ripley on the 9th things had got so far out of hand that the commanding general moved all his troops out of town and established strict regulations for the protection of the citizens and for the maintenance of discipline in his own ranks. He set up a provost marshal's office at the courthouse, and surrounded the town with a line of pickets with strict orders to let no one in or out without proper passes. As to pillaging, one paragraph reads, "All men found with plunder in their possession or in private homes will be separated from the others and immediately tied up and no food will be furnished them except bread and water. If no rope is to be found, use withes. Report their cases". Other provisions were that all Confederate soldiers in and near houses were to be surrendered; the well soldiers were to be sent as prisoners of war to Corinth, the sick were to be paroled. There is one gruesome sentence in the order: "Your attention is call also to spies, and the Major General commanding

Invasion IV

Contemporary reports indicate that Rosecrans made a sincere effort to maintain order during his stay in Ripley; even one young lady who emphatically had no use for Yankees admitted that he listened to her politely enough (even though she did refer to him, doubtless thinking of him German name, as "an old Hessian") and immediately sent a guard to clear the premises about which she had complained. But despite his efforts, there was a great deal of looting during the three days the Northern troops were camped around the town.¹⁰

Rosecrans had followed Van Dorn to Ripley with three divisions; those of Major General D.S. Stanley and Major General John MacArthur, which had taken part in the fighting at Corinth, and that of Major General James B. McPherson, which had been sent by Grant from Jackson but reached Corinth after the battle was over. McPherson's division led the putsuit, and took position south of the town, either in King Creek bottom or on the hill immediately to the south. It is clear from the correspondence that Rosecrans intended to spend some time in Ripley, or at least use the town as a base for a further pursuit of Van Dorn. But he was recalled by Grant, and on the 11th Stanley's and McArthur's divisions began the

Invasion IV

Although Rosecrans made an effort to confine the war to combatants, his example was not followed by some of the other Federal commanders. Even before the battle of Corinth the Union troops in the west had adopted a policy of living off the country, and it was inevitable that in the process of foraging abuses to property and persons should take place. The hardening of the Federal policy in north Mississippi and west Tennessee came about the time the first groups of Partisan Rangers came into combat; the first written notice of the shift in policy is in a letter from Halleck to Grant, dated August 2, the day after Falkner's regiment was organized. It reads in part "It is desirable that you clean out west Tennessee and north Mississippi of all organized enemies. If necessary take all active sympathizers and either hold them as prisoners or put them beyond our lines. Handle that class without gloves and take all their property for public use. As soon as the corn gets fit for forage get all the supplies you can from the Rebels in North Mississippi. It is time they should begin to feel the presence of war on their side..."¹¹

The spirit of Halleck's letter rapidly filtered down into the lower ranks of the army. McPherson, then stationed at Bolivar, was given a list of

Invasion IV

"secession" families in Bolivar who should be watched and, in case they become to active, sent beyond the lines.¹² Later Major General Hurlbut at Memphis reported that he was preparing a list of Confederate sympathizers to be removed from their homes in case of further "guerrilla" attacks.¹³ Toward the end of 1862 Maj. John J. Mudd of the Second Illinois Cavalry turned in a report which is indicative of the thinking of at least some of the Union officers: "Near Hickory Flats, 26 miles south of this place (Holly Springs) live several wealthy and unscrupulous rebels. One of the by the name of Morton is said to be employed much the tine in paroling deserters from the 109th Kansas Volunteers;¹⁴ Another by the name of Marmon is said to be engaged in the same business; one by the name of Johnson, a New York man, has a large stock of cattle and 200 sheep, and a Mr. Potts has a very large Property. I mention these last names to apprise you of the whereabouts of stock to forage on in case of necessity".

The same officer reported on another occasion that "Most of the citizens of Tippah County are unwilling supporters of the Rebellion, and should be as far possible protected from the lawless bands of straggling thieves always following an army".¹⁵ It would be interesting to know how Major Mudd reconciled his solicitude in one report for the oppressed citizenry with his recommendation in the other that they be plundered.

Invasion IV

The methods of collecting forage and subsistence naturally varied according to the temperaments of the different commanders. The prescribed procedure was to have receipts for all material taken for government use, if anyone was on hand to take the receipts; it was provided that at the close of hostilities the material would be paid for upon proof loyalty. But more often than not no effort was made to find the owner and his goods were simply carried off. Nor were Union soldiers the only offenders in that respect; some of the Confederate units were guilty of taking what they wanted on the comfortable theory that the owner was a Union sympathizer - there were numerous complaints of the Partisan Rangers in that respect - and as the war went on, and northern Mississippi became a no-man's land overrun by both armies but held by neither, more and more stragglers drifted into the area and lived off the country by any means they could. The citizens of north Mississippi were thus stripped of much of their food and forage not only by the two armies, but by outlaw bands that followed the armies. At least some of the blame for such a state of affairs must be laid at the feet of Halleck, whose letter to Grant makes it plain that the idea of all-out war against the entire population was conceived not by Sheraton in Georgia in 1864, but by Halleck in Mississippi in 1863. In more ways than one, west Tennessee and north Mississippi were the testing grounds in which Sherman perfected the tactics he used on his march through Georgia.

and Bragg's retreat from Kentucky, so strengthened the Union position in the west that Grant felt that it was safe to begin his campaign against Vicksburg.¹⁶

Invasion IV

He accordingly concentrated at Bolivar and moved south along the Mississippi Central Railroad, reaching Grand Junction on November 8 and Holly Springs on November 13. He repaired the railroad as he advanced, using it, in conjunction with the Mobile and Ohio north of Jackson, as his supply line. During late November and early December he built up a large supply depot at Holly Springs, and by the middle of the month had occupied and repaired the railroad to Oxford and sent advance units 17 miles farther south toward Grenada. Holly Springs was left with a garrison off 1,500 men under Colonel Murphy of the Eighth Wisconsin.

But while Grant was doggedly pushing south toward Vicksburg, Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and Van Dorn ruined his Christmas. Forrest, in Tennessee, staged a raid on the Mobile and Ohio north of Jackson that destroyed the line so effectively that it was not repaired until after the war had ended. At the same time Van Dorn with about 3,000 cavalry moved from Grenada to New Albany with the plan, which was completely successful, of making the Union "scouts" which infested the country think that he was again going toward Corinth. North of New Albany he turned quickly west and on December 20 rushed into Holly Springs, captured the garrison, took all the supplies he could carry away, and burned the rest. The Federal loss was estimated at three million dollars; the explosion of the magazine was heard at Ripley, almost 40 miles away.¹⁷ After the raid Van Dorn retired toward Ripley and at 2 PM on the 23rd him cavalrymen, mostly garbed in captured blue uniforms and carrying new Federal arms and other equipment, passed though the town and continued south on the New Albany road. The Union pursuers overtook them about two miles south of town, and brought up artillery that did

Invasion IV

little damage to the Confederates but did put a cannon ball through Rev. W. A. Gray's house (Located on the west side of the Pontotoc road, Sec. 26-4-3). The Yankees followed Van Dorn as far as New Albany, pillaging the country as they went; they did but little damage in Ripley, as they were there only a short time.¹⁸ On their return, however, on Christmas eve, they caused much heartbreak in the home of Dr. Jno. Y. Murry. While the family was gathered around the Christmas tree a group of northern soldiers entered, pulled off and ate the strings of popcorn with which it was decorated, and devoured the cakes and cookies around it. The next day they came again, took the Christmas turkey out of the oven and ate it, leaving the family nothing but sweet potatoes in the ashes that the soldiers had overlooked. There wore other instances of this nature also.¹⁹

After the raids of Forrest and Van Dorn, Grant realized that he could not keep a rail supply line open across north Mississippi and west Tennessee. With that determination and adaptability which are two of his most marked characteristics, he wasted no time in attempting the impossible, but shifted his base to Memphis. He moved his headquarters from Oxford back to Holly Springs, where he remained until January 10, 1863, when he moved to Memphis. He sent most of his army down the river to the crossings south of Vicksburg, and of necessity the

Invasion IV

At the beginning of 1862 the war in northern Mississippi was being fought by two armies, under the normally accepted rules of civilized warfare. When the year ended the conflict had involved directly every person in the region and many of the old rules, especially those relating to the rights off non-combatants, had gone by the board. On both sides the war was fought savagely, and as neither side ever held the area securely, outlaws came in singly and in bands to take what the armies had left. The four horsemen of the Apocalypse - War, Famine, Disease, and Death, descended upon the country and ran roughshod over the inhabitants.

Notes of Chapter I

1. Grant, pp. 210-211
2. Letter from Mrs. W. R. Cole to a "cousin in Franklin, Tennessee" dated November 2, 1862 but not finished or mailed until December 28. The location of the original letter is unknown; it was published in the Southern Sentinel April 25, 1935 (hereinafter cited as Cole). Though the fate of the original is unknown, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the letter.

Mrs. Cole presented the flag to Co. F of the Second Mississippi in April 1861. Her husband was a merchant of Ripley who after the war moved to Pueblo, Colorado.
3. Known later as the Thurmond place, then the Holt place; owned in 1954 by Mrs. Lee Cox. The letter from Mrs. Cole states that Van Dorn used their home as headquarters. The authority for Price's headquarters is a request from him, in O. R., that the Female Academy be reserved for him.
4. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. I, p. 148
5. The location of the Ripley-Pocahontas road at the site of Metamora is unchanged since the war. West of the Junction the old State Line road is still in use, but it has been abandoned to the east. The deep cut at the top of the hill, and the remains of the causeway across the bottom, however, can still be traced, as can the remains of the road east of the river. No trace of the bridge can be found, though it can be located within a hundred feet or so. The old or Davis Bridge Crossing is about two miles south of the present crossing of the Hatchie by the State Line road in Pocahontas.
6. Hubbard, Gen. Lucius H., Minnesota at the battle of Corinth: Minnesota Historical Society Collections, Vol. 12, pp. 531-553, 1908.
7. Cole, op. cit.
8. Cole, op. cit.; Davis, 4

The Seventh Kansas was a regiment of such notoriety that a brief sketch of it is included here. Of its ten companies, only five were from Kansas; four were from Illinois, and one, Co. K, was from Ashtabula, Ohio and was originally commanded by Capt. John Brown, Jr., a son of the ruffian of Ossawatomie whom northern propaganda has transformed into a martyr. Brown resigned because of "ill health" May 27, 1862, and thus never engaged in the Mississippi fighting.

In the spring of 1862 a Union regiment broke into the railroad station at Trenton, Tennessee, and took about $100 worth of sugar. The Seventh Kansas blamed the Second Illinois, the Second Illinois the Seventh Kansas. General Grant, doubtless influenced by the previous record of the regiments, decided that the Seventh Kansas was guilty and ordered it to repay the $100. The regiment refused, and as a result Grant withheld their pay for nine months. A little later, in the same vicinity, the regiment got into the limelight by refusing to return fugitive slaves to their owners. As the Union policy at that time was to scrupulously recognize the property rights of slave-owners, especially in border regions, this action was most embarrassing. Col. Daniel R. Anthony, then command the regiment, not only refused to change the policy but issued an order which read: "Any officer or soldier of this command, who shall arrest and deliver to his owner a fugitive slave, shall be summarily and severely punished according to the laws relating to such crimes". The brigade commander demanded that Anthony rescind the order; when Anthony refused, he was succeeded by Col. A. L. Lee.

A little later, at Jackson, Tennessee, the regiment stopped contrary to orders inside Logan's lines to fill their canteens. An officer, after one more or less routine attempt to get them to move on, rode up saying, "General Logan orders this damned abolitionist regiment outside his lines or he will order out a battery and drive it out". The men got into their saddles, but instead of moving on sent back the word: "Go tell General Logan to bring out his dammed battery and we will show him how quick this damned abolition regiment will capture it". When neither side budged, a compromise was reached whereby the regiment moved on, but they made it a point to go by Logan's headquarters singing "John Brown's body" on their way to a camp site south of town.

The sketch above is taken from Fox, Simeon M., The Seventh Kansas Cavalry, its service in the Civil war, an address before the State Historical Society, Dec. 2, 1902: Topeka, State Printing Office, 1908. Fox was adjutant of the regiment and wrote several other articles about it.

The regiment was not only hated and feared by the Confederates; it was almost equally obnoxious to the Union commanders. This is shown by a letter written by Halleck to Secretary of War Stanton on July 7, 1862 shortly after the Jackson incident, which reads in part"; Since the Kansas troops entered this department their march has been marked by robbery, theft, pillages, and outrages upon the peaceful inhabitants, making enemies for our cause wherever they went. Brig. Gen. Quinby reported that he found it impossible to restrain them, and asked for authority to muster them out of the service. . . . I. . . shall do my best to reduce them to proper discipline but am very doubtful of success as long as bad officers, supported as allege by political influence at Washington, encourage them in violating laws, regulations, and orders . . ." While this letter refers to all Kansas troops, the records show that the Seventh was by far the worst of a bad lot and Halleck unquestionably had that regiment in mind. (Letter in O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVlI, par II, p.77)
9. O.R., Set. I, Vol. XVII; Pt. II, p. 271
10. Cole, op. cit.
11. O. R.
12. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 297
13. Same, Ser. I, Vol. XXIV, Pt. II, p. 485
14. O. R., Same, Pt. I, p. 514. Note the disparaging reference to the Kansas troops. And one might wonder just how a civilian could "parole" deserters.
15. Same, p. 515
16. Grant, p. 218
17. Cole, op. cit.
18. Davis, 9
19. Mrs. Lizzie Murry Hunt to Mrs. E. R. Richey. Both Mrs. Hunt and Mrs. Richey are daughters of Dr. Murry, and Mrs. Hunt, a child at the time, remembered the incident distinctly. She dated the incident in 1863, but other evidence makes it practically certain that the correct year was 1862. The letter was published in the Southern Sentinal. See also Cole, op. cit. The Murry residence was on Jackson street, between Spring and Mulberry.
20. Grant, p. 227

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Invasion I

May - December 1862 By Andrew Brown

Chapter I

Invasion I

Invasion I

Invasion I

Invasion I

Invasion II

May - December 1862 By Andrew Brown

Chapter II

Invasion II

Invasion II

Invasion II

Invasion III

May - December 1862 By Andrew Brown

Chapter III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion III

Invasion IV

May - December 1862 By Andrew Brown

Chapter IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

Invasion IV

May - December 1862

By Andrew Brown

May - December 1862

By Andrew Brown

May - December 1862
By Andrew Brown

May - December 1862

By Andrew Brown