Infantry.  The attack was divided into three small
groups, the whole under the command of Lieutenant
Crabbe: No. I group under Lieutenant Papineau,
No. 2 group under Sergeant Patterson, and No.3
group under Company Sergeant-Major Lloyd.
   The head of the party got within fifteen or twenty
yards the German trench and charged; it was
dark at the time (about 5.15 a.m.).
   Lieutenant Crabbe, who showed the greatest dash
and élan took his party over everything in the trench
until they had gone down it about eighty yards,
when they were stopped by a barricade of sandbags
and timber. This party, as well as the others, then
pulled down the front face of the German parapet.
A number of Germans were killed and wounded,
and a few prisoners were taken.
   The services performed by this distinguished
corps have  continued to be very valuable since I
had occasion to refer to them in my last despatch.
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel F. D. Farquhar,
D.S.O. who, I deeply regret to say, was killed while
superintending some trench work on March 20th.
His loss will be deeply felt.

         
   It is satisfactory to be able to record that, though
the troops occupying the first line of trenches were
at first overwhelmed, they afterwards behaved very
gallantly in the counter-attack for the recovery of
         

         
the lost ground, and the following units earned and
received the special commendation of the Army
Commander. The 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers, the
2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 1st
Leinster Regiment, the 4th Rifle Brigade, and the
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

         
  On February 15th the Canadian Division began
to arrive in this country. I inspected the Division,
which was under the command of Lieut.-General
E. A. H. Alderson, C.B., on February 20th
  They presented a splendid and most soldier-like
appearance on parade.  The men were of good
physique, hard, and fit. I judged by what I saw
of them that they were well trained, and quite able
to take their places in the line of battle.
   Since then the Division has thoroughly justified
the good opinion I formed of it.
   The troops of the Canadian Division were first
attached for a few days by brigades for training
in the 3rd Corps trenches under Lieut.-General Sir
William Pulteney, who gave me such an excellent
report of their efficiency that i was able to employ
them in the trenches early in March.
  During the battle of Neuve Chapelle they held a
part of the line allotted to the 1st Army, and
although they were not actually engaged in the main
attack, they rendered valuable help by keeping the
enemy actively employed in front of their trenches.

         
infantry brigade, which had just been withdrawn
after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting
about Vlamertinghe.
  Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy at-
tacked the French Division about 5 p.m., using
asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft re-
ported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had
been seen issuing from the German trenches between
Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported
tbat two simultaneous attacks had been made east
of the Ypres-Staden railway, in which these
asphyxiating gases had been employed.
  What followed almost defies description.  The
effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as
to render the whole of the line held by the French
Division mentioned above practically incapable of
any action at all.  It was at first impossible for
anyone to realise what had actually happened.  The
smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and
hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or
dying condition, and within an hour the whole posi-
tion had to be abandoned, together with about fifty
guns.
   I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of
attaching the least blame to the French Division
for this unfortunate incident.
  After all the examples our gallant Allies have
shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many
trying situations in which they have been placed
throughout the course of this campaign, it is quite
superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the
incident, and I would only express my firm con-
viction that if any troops in the world had been
able to hold their trenches in the face of such a

Officer Commanding the 2nd Army. I also directed
other reserve troops from the 3rd Corps and the
1st Army to be held in readiness to meet eventuali-
ties.
  In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Ger-
 mans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steen
straate and some works south of Lizerne, all of
which were in occupation by the French.
   The enemy having thus established himself to
the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat appre-
hensive of this succeeding in driving a wedge be-
tween the French and Belgian troops at this point.
  I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforce-
ments sent north should be used to support and
assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in pre-
venting any further advance of the Germans west
 of the canal.
  At about ten o'clook en the morning of the 23rd
connection was finally ensured between the left of
the Canadian Division and the French right, about
eight hundred yards east of the canal; but as this
entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a
much longer line than that which they had held
before the attack commenced on the previous night,
there were no reserves available for counter-attack
until reinforcements which were ordered up from
the Second Army were able to deploy to the east
of Ypres.
              *           *           *
 Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see
General Foch, arid from him I received a detailed
account of what had happened, as reported by
General Putz. General Foch informed me that it
was his intention to make good the original line and