Misc. Notes
Martin M. Harry, Rank-Private, Age-19, 5’7”, dark hair, gray eyes, single, farmer, nativity-Lewisburg, Lewis Co, KY, enrolled for service Oct 6, 1862 at Urbana by C. C. Huntley, for 3 years, mustered in-Jan 21, 1863, Springfield, IL by ?. Residence-Urbana, Champaign Co, IL; mustered out-Aug 1865, Nashville, TN by Capt. Chickering. Promoted to Sergeant.
345The 16th Illinois Volunter Cavalry was organized at Camp Butler on 15 Jan 1863 and was mustered out 19 Aug 1865. During it’s tour of service, 3 officers were killed or mortally wounded; 1 officer died of disease, accident, ect.; 30 enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded and 228 enlisted men died of disease, accident, etc.
From March 1863 to June 1863, the 16th was attached to the 4th Separate of the Middle Department. From June 1863 to December 1863, they were attached to Averell’s 4th Separate, Department of West Virginia. From September 1863 to October 1863 they were at Cumberland Gap as part of the Left Wing Corps, East Tennessee, Army and Department of Ohio. From December 1863 to April 1864, they were with the 2nd Brigade, 4th Division, Department of West Virginia. During the period, January 1864 to April 1864, they were with the District Division of the Clinch, Left Wing Corps, East Tennessee, Army and Department of Ohio.
During april 1864, they were with the 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, Cavalry Corps, Army and Department of Ohio. From April 1864 to June 1864, the 16th was attached to the 2nd Brigade, Cavalry Division, District of Kentucky Corps, Army and Department of Ohio. From April 1864-July 1964, they were at Harper’s Ferry with the West SH Brigade, Reserve Division, Department of West Virginia.
From May 1864 to June 1864, the 16th was attached to the 1st Brigade, Cavalry Division, Army and Department of Ohio. From June to August 1864 with the Cavalry Brigade, 23rd Corps, Army and Department of Ohio. August 1865-September 1864 the 16th was Dismounted. From September to November 1864, they were attached to the 1st Brigade, Cavalry Division, Army and Department of Ohio. From November 1864 to muster-out in August 1865, they were attached to the 1st Brigade, 6th Division, Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi.
["The 16th Illinois Volunteer Cavalry has the sad distinction of having more of its men die in Confederate prisons than any other Illinois regiment. A total of 157 men of the 16th Illinois met that fate - almost 11 percent of the 1,462 men who served in the regiment. In fact, of the more than two thousand Union regiments that served in the Civil War, only eight lost more men in Confederate prisons than did the 16th Illinois Cavalry." ... "Of the twelve men from Champaign County, Illinois who served in Company I, only two completed their terms of service." - From Salt Fork to Chickamauga, by Robert H. Behrens]
OFFICIAL RECORD:
Martin M. Harry (Union)
Enlistment:
- Residing in Urbana, IL at time of enlistment
- Enlisted on Dec 6 1862 as Private
Mustering information:
- Enlisted into I Company,
16th Cavalry (Illinois) on Jan 21 1863
- Mustered out from
16th Cavalry (Illinois) on Aug 19 1865 at Nashville, TN
Promotions:
- Promoted to Sergt (Full, Vol) (date not indicated)
Sources for the above information:
- Illinois: Roster of Officers and Enlisted Men, (1900)
16th Illinois Cavalry Regiment (Union)
- Organized on Jan 15 1863 at Camp Butler, Springfield, IL
- Enlistment term: 3 years
- Mustered out on Aug 19 1865 at Nashville, TN
Available statistics for total numbers of men listed as:
- Enlisted or commissioned: 1104
- Drafted: 6
- Transferred in: 234
- Killed or died of wounds (Officers): 3
- Killed or died of wounds (Enlisted men): 30
- Died of disease (Officers): 1
- Died of disease (Enlisted men): 228
- Prisoner of war: 329
- Died while prisoner of war: 155
- Disabled: 61
- Missing: 5
- Deserted: 280
- Discharged: 57
- Mustered out: 563
- Transferred out: 41
Historical notes and Reports:ILLINOIS
16TH CAVALRY
(Three Years)
Sixteenth Cavalry.-Col., Christian Thielemann; Lieut.-Cols., Robert W. Smith, Nathan C. Goodenow; Majs., Christian Thielemann, Friedrich Schambeck, Charles H. Beers, Milo Thielemann, Hiram S. Hanchett, John Hoffman, Francis Jackson. This regiment was composed principally of Chicago men, Thielemann's and Schambeck's cavalry companies, raised at the outset of the war, forming the nucleus of the organization. The former company served as Gen. Sherman's bodyguard for some time. On June 11, 1863, the regimental organization was completed, and mustered in for three years, and in October the regiment was ordered to Knoxville, Tenn., where a portion of it participated in the defense of that place in November and December. On Jan. 3, 1864, a detachment under Maj. Beers was attacked by three of Longstreet's brigades and after maintaining its ground for 10 hours against five times its own number, losing heavily in killed and wounded, its ammunition gave out and it was compelled to surrender. The loss of the regiment upon this occasion was 356 men and 56 officers. The remainder of the regiment arrived at Red Clay, Ga., May 10, and on the 12th, was engaged in the battle of Varnell's station, where it lost 1 officer wounded and captured, and 12 men. It was then on duty almost every day from that time until after the fall of Atlanta-a period of nearly four months-during which it participated in the battles of Rocky Face ridge, Buzzard Roost, Resaca, Kingston, Cassville, Cartersville, Allatoona, Kennesaw and Lost mountains, Powder springs, Chattahoochee river, and various engagements in front of Atlanta and Jonesboro. On the retreat before Hood from Florence, it kept up a running fight with the enemy for three days and nights, until it reached Columbia. In a 6 hours' engagement at Duck river the regiment held its position triumphantly against a vastly superior force of the Confederates until dusk. It next participated in the battle of Franklin and in various skirmishes between there and Nashville. It engaged in the two days' battle at the latter place, and in the pursuit of the enemy to the Tennessee river. It remained in Tennessee and Alabama on scouting duty until July 2, when it was ordered to Franklin. Tenn., where it remained scouring the country in all directions until ordered to Nashville for muster out. It arrived in Chicago on Aug. 23, 1865, for final payment and discharge. The original force of the regiment was 1,200 men. It received 100 recruits, and at its discharge could muster only 285 men, showing a casualty list of nearly 1,000.
Source: The Union Army, vol. 3
Battle Data
Columbia, Tennessee
Nov 24 1864 to Nov 28 1864Accounts and reports:Columbia, Tenn.
Nov. 24-28, 1864
U. S. Troops under Gen. Schofield.
To check Hood's advance on Nashville Gen. Thomas sent Maj.-Gen. John M. Schofield to the south of Duck river.
Schofield's army consisted of the 4th army corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. D. S. Stanley; the 3d division of the 23d corps, under Maj.-Gen. J. D. Cox; Hatch's cavalry division and the cavalry brigades of Gen. Croxton and Col. Capron, the entire force amounting to 18,000 infantry and four brigades of cavalry.
One brigade and two regiments of Ruger's division of the 23d corps joined Schofield at Columbia.
Opposed to this force was Hood's army of about 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.
The Confederates drove the Union cavalry from Lawrenceburg on the 22nd and from that point advanced on Columbia. Schofield sent Cox forward to that point and he arrived on the morning of the 24th just in time to repulse a large force of the enemy that was driving back Capron's brigade on the Mount Pleasant road.
By the evening of the 25th Hood had his entire army in front of Schofield, who then decided to cross to the north side of the river as his line was already too extended to be effective in case of an assault on his position, and besides there was danger of the enemy crossing above Columbia and getting in the rear of the Federals, thus cutting off communications with Thomas at Nashville.
To guard against this flank movement Schofield sent Cox, with two brigades, to the north bank of the river, and ordered Ruger to the railroad bridge, where he was to construct a bridge-head and occupy it. At daylight on the morning of the 26th a pontoon bridge was laid near the railroad bridge, a short distance below the town and everything made ready for a crossing, though some troops were still kept on the south side of the river in the hope that reinforcements would arrive in time to keep Hood from crossing.
Not until the evening of the 27th was the south bank entirely abandoned by the Federals, though all that day the line had been closely pressed at all points by the enemy.
Once on the north side of the river, Ruger was left to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge, Cox occupied a position in front of Columbia and Stanley was moved to the rear on the Franklin pike, where he could act as a reserve and at the same time guard against a flank movement in case the enemy should effect a crossing anywhere near the town.
Wilson's cavalry was guarding the fords above, and about 2 AM on the 28th Gen. Wilson sent word that the Confederates were crossing in force near Huey's mill, the cavalry having crossed near the Lewisburg pike to clear the way for the main body.
Stanley was then sent to Spring Hill to cover the trains and the army began to fall back to Franklin. Numerous skirmishes occurred about Columbia during these operations, but no casualties were reported.
Source: The Union Army, Vol.,5 p.,310
Jonesville, Virginia
Jan 3 1864 to Jan 5 1864- Union killed: 12
- Union wounded: 48
- Union captured/missing: 300
- Total Union losses: 360
- Confederate killed: 4
- Confederate wounded: 12
- Total Confederate losses: 16
Accounts and reports:JONESVILLE. VA.
JANUARY 3-5, 1864
Jonesville, Va., Jan. 3-5, 1864. Detachment of the 16th Illinois Cavalry and 22nd Ohio Battery. After having driven the Confederates from Jonesville, Maj. Charles H. Beeres camped in that place on Friday and Saturday nights. Early Sunday morning (the 5th) his command was surprised by the enemy, under Brig.-Gen. William E. Jones, and driven in confusion for some distance. Beeres finally rallied his men and fought until 3 p. m., when, having had 31 men killed, he surrendered the re-mainder of his command, which originally consisted of about 250 men, a rifled gun and 2 mountain howitzers. The enemy lost 5 killed and 11 wounded.
Source: The Union Army, vol. 6
*************************************************************************************
Report of Col. Wilson C. Lemert, Eighty-sixth Ohio Infantry.
HDQRS. U. S. FORCES,
Cumberland Gap, January 5, 1864.
COL.: I have the honor to make the following report: I regret to inform you of the loss of Maj. Beeres' command, Third Battalion, Sixteenth Illinois Cavalry, parts of two companies Sixteenth Illinois Cavalry, First Lieut. A. B. Alger, and 17 men, Twenty-second Ohio Battery, 2 mountain howitzers and 1 3-inchRodman gun.
On the 1st of this month I directed Maj. Beeres to attack the rebel force at Jonesville, which was reported to me as 400 men of Sixty-fourth and Twenty-seventh Virginia Mounted Infantry.
Maj. Beeres' command camped at Jonesville on Friday night, and asI learn only picketed the road in the direction of Stickleyville. At daybreak Sunday morning, Gen. Sam. Jones' command of 2,000rebels attacked Maj. Beeres from the direction of Mulberry Gap, completely surprising and for some time driving him into confusion. The major finally rallied his men and fought the enemy till 3 p.m., when, his artillery ammunition having been some time exhausted, and he having had 1 lieutenant and about 30 men killed, and 2 lieutenants wounded, he surrendered his force of about 250 men, 1 rifled gun, and 2 mountain howitzers.
I have the above report from a servant of one of Maj. Beeres' officers.The enemy has driven in my outposts, and on Sunday last he captured one of my forage trains, 21 wagons, some 15 miles this [side] of Jonesville, that Maj. Beeres was protecting.
The Seventy-first, Twenty-first, Eighty-fifth, Ninety-seventh Sixty-fourth, Twenty-seventh, and Ninth Virginia and the Tenth Kentucky rebel regiments are said to be at Jonesville; the exact number I can not learn. The Eleventh Tennessee Cavalry is at Mulberry Gap, but I have been compelled to send couriers to recall them. I have ordered Col. Thielemann to detain Col. Matson's command untiI can communicate with Gen. Willcox and send one battalion to this post, which I hope will meet the approval of the general. With the force here now I am unable to procure forage or subsistence for my command. Lieut.-Col. Matson has been delayed in complying with Special Orders, No. 63, until now, on account of his horses being unshod and unable to travel.
The servant who escaped from Maj. Beeres' command further informs me that a short time before the surrender the major could have retreated in this direction, but he took up another position and renewed the attack, and in less than an hour he found his ammunition exhausted and his force surrounded, and was compelled to surrender.
I telegraphed Capt. Bell, commissary of subsistence. Camp Nelson, about the 20th of December for subsistence for my command for thirty days, and he replied in two days that he had started one train and was about to start another, but as I have telegraphed to London I can hear of no train for this post. I fear my subsistence has been turned toward Knoxville. I have only one day's full rations for my present command of hard bread or flour and salt meat, but plenty of fresh meat, sugar, and coffee.
I am just informed that a force of 1,400 rebel cavalry left Jonesville for Mulberry Gap immediately after Maj. Beeres surrendered, and I fear the gap has been taken with the garrison of the Eleventh Tennessee Cavalry.
I have the honor to be, colonel, your obedient servant
W. C. LEMERT,
Col., Cmdg. Forces at Cumberland Gap and Tazewell.
Col. BOWMAN,
Chief of Staff.
Report of Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Confederate forces in East Tennessee.
RUSSELLVILLE, January 9, 1864.
A portion of our cavalry, under Brig. Gen. W. E. Jones, attacked on the 3d instant a force of 300 of the enemy near Jonesville, and killed and wounded and captured the whole of it, with 3 pieces of artillery and 20 wagons and teams.
J. LONGSTREET,
Lieut.-Gen.
Gen. S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector-Gen.
-----------
Report of Brig. Gen. William E. Jones, C. S.
Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade.
HDQRS. JONES' CAVALRY BRIGADE,
Jonesville, Va., January 7, 1864.
COL.: Preparatory to executing the design imparted in your confidential note of the 28th ultimo,* I moved my command across Clinch River on the 2d instant. Soon after going into camp information reached me that the enemy had driven Lieut.-Col. Pridemore, through this place, and was still going east. I at once determined to cross Powell's Mountain that night to attack him in rear, and ordered Col. Pridemore to attack in front as soon as he found me engaged. The weather was intensely cold. Many of my men could not be started from their camps. Every halt of a few moments fires were started, and probably more than half of those who did leave were far in rear before daylight. The road was rough and in many places almost impassable from ice, but onward we went with all that could or would go. One man was frozen to death and many were badly frost-bitten.
Arriving at daylight in the vicinity of the enemy, well night conquered by the hardships encountered by my poorly clad and shod men, I had the satisfaction to find we were unexpected guests. No pickets were on the road we came. We were charging their camp before they were aware of our presence. They flew to their arms and fought manfully. Our leading company succeeded in capturing their artillery, but was not supported quickly enough to avoid losing it again. The enemy falling back took shelter in a farm-house and outbuildings, placing his artillery so advantageously as to make a heavy sacrifice of life necessary to dislodge him. Feeling secure of the prey my men were kept well sheltered, and skirmished just enough to keep the enemy firing his artillery to exhaust its ammunition. Toward sundown Col. Pridemore made his appearance east of the enemy, my command being to the west, thus hemming him in the valley.
About this time the enemy quitted the houses and took position on a neighboring eminence. As soon as he was far enough from his shelter to make return impossible a general assault was ordered, a surrender enforced in a few minutes.
We captured 383 officers and men, 45 of whom were wounded, and we killed 10, took 3 pieces of artillery and 26 6-mule wagons and teams. Five of the wagons were broken in the capture.
Early on the morning of the 4th one of my scouts returned, reporting the garrison at Cumberland Gap from 1,000 to 1,500, which was confirmed from other sources.
My ammunition was nearly exhausted and my wagons, being compelled to make a detour by Pattonsville, did not reach me until the evening of the 5th, when it was too late to effect what was intended for me to undertake. There is probably subsistence enough for my men and horses to March 1 in this county, though long forage will be scant.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. E. JONES,
Brig.-Gen., Cmdg.
Col. G. M. SORREL,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army East Tennessee.
[Indorsement.]
JANUARY 21, 1864.
Respectfully submitted to the President, who may be interested by the success alluded to by the explanation of the causes that frustrated the more important enterprise.
J. A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.
-----------
Report of Lieut. Col. Alphonso F. Cook, Eighth Virginia Cavalry.
HDQRS. EIGHTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY,
March 10, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to herewith transmit a report of the part taken by the Eighth Regt. Virginia Cavalry in the action at Jonesville, Lee County, Va., on the 3d day of January, 1864.
On reaching the point in rear of the enemy's camp from which the attack was made about 8 a.m., I received an order from Gen. Jones to place the three companies armed with pistols and sabers in front. I did so, and placed Capt. H. C. Everett in command of those companies, with instructions to charge the enemy's camp and take his artillery and hold him in check until I could support him with the other six companies. Capt. Everett advanced at the trot until he came opposite the camp, when he ordered one company to charge the camp and the other two to charge after the battery of 3 guns which the enemy was endeavoring to get into position in the road about 500 yards from their camp. I was prevented from following up and supporting Capt. Everett as it should have been done in consequence of a bad place in the road, through which the men were compelled to ride by file. When I reached the point at which we entered the camp I could not ascertain where Capt. Everett was, and supposing the whole force of the enemy to be in the camp I dismounted my men as quickly as possible and went to the relief of the company then engaged.
In the mean time Capt. Everett had taken possession of the artillery, held it a few minutes, and had been driven back by overwhelming numbers. My men, aided by a portion of the Twenty-seventh Virginia Battalion, drove the enemy's advance in a few minutes from their positions behind trees, rocks, &c., in the camp, when they fled in confusion back to where their main force had taken position in and around Milburn's house. I then reformed the six companies and advanced through the field under fire from the artillery to a fence about 400 yards from their position. Here I halted and kept up a heavy fire from a few minutes, when I received an order from Gen. Jones to move my command to the hill on the left and take possession of Milburn's house if possible. I then left two companies to guard the road, and took the other four with me to the top of the hill. Here I found a portion of the enemy's force, and after collecting all the men I could from other commands we drove them from the woods through the corn-field and down the hill into Milburn's house and outhouses. As soon as I cam in full view of their position and numbers I saw that it would be folly to attempt to take the house, as I saw more men enter it and the outhouses than I had with me to make the attack. I then withdrew into the woods again to await further orders. The enemy made several attempts to regain the woods, but failed in all.
About 3 p.m. I received an order from Gen. Jones to send a portion of my command across to the road leading to Crank's Gap. I sent three companies under Capt. Rocke to that road, and went myself to bring up the two companies that were left on the road. Before I could return an advance was made by the whole command and the enemy surrendered unconditionally.
The loss in the regiment was-Lieut. A. H. Samuels and 4 enlisted men killed and 7 wounded.
Both officers and men behaved as well as could be expected under the circumstances.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. F. COOK,
Lieut.-Col., Cmdg. Eighth Virginia Cavalry.
Lieut. W. M. HOPKINS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-Gen.
-----------
Report of Capt. John B. Thompson, Twenty-seventhVirginia Cavalry Battalion.
Official report of the part taken by the Twenty-seventh Virginia Battalion of Cavalry in the engagement at Jonesville, Lee County, Va., on January 3, 1864:
LIEUT.: On arriving within half a mile of the enemy's camp on the morning of January 3 I was directed by Gen. W. E. Jones, commanding, to move my battalion, already in column of fours, to the main Cumberland Gap road, a short distance north of its then present position, and upon reaching that road to charge the enemy's camp in concert with two companies of the Eighth Virginia Cavalry, who would upon the river road. On arriving upon eminence above Wynn's house, a short distance west of the enemy's camp, I became aware that I was ahead of the two companies of the Eighth; but satisfied that my approach had been perceived by parties of the enemy who ran out of Wynn's house in the direction of their camp, I determined to charge the enemy before they could be aroused in their camp and get to their arms. This I did successfully, capturing quite all the force stationed on the Cumberland Gap road, amounting to 55.
In the loss I sustained a loss of 4 men severely wounded. The enemy's loss was 3 killed on the field and 6 wounded.
After the capture of this force I dismounted my men, and leaving a detachment sufficient to guard the prisoners I moved rapidly with the remainder of my battalion within a short distance of the junction of the Cumberland Gap and river road, below or west of Milburn's house, into which and the outhouses a large body of the enemy had taken refuge. Here I took position and awaited the arrival of the rest of the troops. Shortly thereafter I moved my command to an eminence on the left or north of the road, the enemy in the mean time having taken position upon a second eminence in my front, also to the left or north of the road. This position I occupied until a general advance was ordered. I then moved directly upon the enemy, who at once opened fire and kept it up until my line was near them. Upon perceiving that they were completely invested by the lines of other commands of the brigade, which were, like with my own, advanced within a short distance of their position, they surrendered about 3 p.m.
My loss in this advance was none killed and none wounded.
My men and officers acted well throughout the engagement.
I am, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN B. THOMPSON,
Capt., Cmdg., &c.
Lieut. W. M. HOPKINS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Jones' Brigade.
-----------
No. 7.
Report of Maj. James R. Claiborne, Thirty-seventh
Virginia Cavalry Battalion.
HDQRS. THIRTY-SEVENTH VIRGINIA BATTALION CAV.,
Ball's Bridge, Lee County, Va., March 8, 1864.
GEN.: In obedience to orders just received calling for my official report of the engagement at Jonesville, Va., on the 3d day of January, 1864, and at Gibson's Mill*, on February 22, 1864, I have the honor to submit the following:
On the evening of January 1, in obedience to orders, I withdrew my pickets from near Mooresburg, on the Rogersville and Knoxville turnpike, and proceeded with my command to rejoin the brigade, then encamped at Little War Gap.
The brigade having moved previous to my arrival at the latter place, I followed and joined the brigade on the evening of January 2 on the north bank of Clinch River. Owing to the swollen condition of the stream and the extreme darkness of the night a number of my men failed to cross, and remained on the south side of the river.
My command was halted on the morning of January 3 with the remainder of brigade for the purpose of reforming. I there ascertained that many of my men had straggled from the line of march on account of the severe cold and their naked condition, many being entirely without shoes. I could not muster more than 100 effective men. One man froze in the saddle and several others were frosted.
I was ordered to follow the Twenty-seventh Virginia Battalion Cavalry. I entered the Jonesville and Cumberland Gap turnpike some 300 yards below the enemy's camp at Jonesville, Va. We moved up at a gallop in column of fours, well closed on the Twenty-seventh Battalion, which halted on the summit of the hill and opened a light fire upon the enemy, at the same time dismounting. The road ahead being blocked, and having no orders but to follow the Twenty-seventh, I dismounted a portion of my command and formed on the left of the turnpike. We pursued the enemy across the field some 100 yards, capturing a number of prisoners. The enemy turning his battery upon us in open field and at short range, my command fell back a short distance, where I succeeded in rallying all, except such as were guarding prisoners to the rear. By your orders I then moved by the left flank and succeeded in carrying a hill heavily timbered and occupied by a few of the enemy's skirmishers and overlooking his battery. Shortly after my occupation of this hill Lieut.-Col. Cook came up with a detachment of the Eighth Virginia Cavalry and took command of the whole. The enemy with a small force made an attempt to retake the hill, but were repulsed and pursued by us to within some 250 yards of his main body, when he opened upon us with grape and canister, and thinking it impracticable to attempt to drive him from the Milburn house, near the center of his lines, we fell back to the summit of the hill, where we remained, exchanging a few occasional shots with the enemy till about 3.30 p.m., when Col. Cook was withdrawn with his detachment. In some twenty minutes after I was ordered to move forward upon the enemy, who had evacuated the Milburn house, and then occupied the hill directly toward Jonesville and in my front.
In making this move the enemy fired several volleys into my advancing line, which was informally drawn on account of the nature of the ground over which we had to pass; and at this time of the engagement I sustained my only loss, which was 4 men severely wounded, none killed.
I continued to advance, and when within 150 yards of the enemy he ceased firing and the engagement on my part here ceased.
Respectfully,
JAMES R. CLAIBORNE,
Maj., Cmdg. Thirty-seventh Virginia Battalion Cavalry.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM E. JONES,
Cmdg. Cavalry Brigade.
Report of Lieut. Col. Auburn L. Pridemore, Sixty-fourth Virginia Cavalry.
HDQRS. SIXTY-FOURTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY,
January 8, 1864.
CAPT.: On the morning of January 3, 1864, I received an order from Brig. Gen. W. E. Jones to press the enemy on the north of the road east of Jonesville. Moving forward double-quick for 11 miles I found Jonesville, occupied by about 50 Yankees. I drew up in line, dismounted, took possession of the hill east of town, and opened fire. In ten minutes we had possession of the town. Not knowing anything of the force or intention of Gen. Jones I dispatched him and awaited his further orders.
In a few minutes I received through a staff officer an order to attack the enemy (now driven by the force below from Milburn's to a position on a high hill west of town) in a line perpendicular to the Valley road. Just as my line of attack was formed Capt. Caudill, with 100 of the Tenth Kentucky, came up, making my whole strength about 230. Maj. Richmond has command of the right, Capt. Caudill of the left wing. We now commenced to advance through an old sage-grass field under fire of their artillery. We moved to within 250 yards of the enemy's line and battery and opened a well-directed fire on his front. After a few rounds I observed that his lines might be easily flanked. I took command of the right wing, leaving Maj. Richmond that of the left and Capt. Caudill's men. I had with me about 50 men. I soon took possession of a small ridge in the enemy's rear, having previously driven the enemy's sharpshooters in off the same ridge. Then ordered Maj. Richmond forward (who was also on the advance) with an intention to unite my whole force and charge the battery, but before I could reorganize the line the enemy surrendered-240 in numbers, 3 pieces of artillery, 405 wagons, all of their arms, horses, &c.
Soldiers from all the regiments coming up who had won honors in the morning and fought with us now, and justly entitled to share with us, joined in collecting the spoils. What was retained in the Sixty-fourth Virginia has been properly accounted for.
The Sixty-fourth Virginia and Tenth Kentucky, both officers and men, acted gallantly, Maj. Richmond conducted his wing with skill and ability.
I had Capt. Poteet, Company B, wounded slightly; Private Bryant, Company B, wounded mortally; Private Ratliff, Company F, in leg slightly; Private Flaney, Company I, in thigh severely. Four non-commissioned officers and privates in Tenth Kentucky wounded. Particulars not known.
I am, captain, your most obedient servant,
A. L. PRIDEMORE,
Lieut. Col., Cmdg. Sixty-fourth Virginia Cavalry.
Capt. MARTIN,
Assistant Adjutant-Gen.
Source: Official Records
PAGE 58-57 KY., SW. VA., TENN., MISS., ALA., AND N. GA. CHAP. LXIV.
[Series I. Vol. 32. Part I, Reports. Serial No. 57.]
Nashville, Tennessee
Dec 14 1864 to Dec 16 1864- Union killed: 387
- Union wounded: 2558
- Union captured/missing: 112
- Total Union losses: 3057
- Confederate captured/missing: 4462
- Total Confederate losses: 4462
Accounts and reports:NASHVILLE, TENN.
DEC. 15-16, 1864.
Nashville, Tenn. Dec. 15-16, 1864. U. S. Forces commanded by Gen. George H. Thomas. After the battle of Franklin on Nov. 30, Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, commanding at Nashville ordered Gen. Schofield to fall back to that city, where Thomas had been industriously engaged for some time in collecting an army of sufficient strength to drive the Confederate forces under Gen. Hood out of the State of Tennessee. Gen. A. J. Smith, with three divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, had been expected to arrive from Missouri in time to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, but he did not reach Nashville until the last day of November. At the time of the battle of Nashville Thomas' army numbered altogether about 55,000 men, though less than 45,000 were actually engaged. The 4th corps, temporarily commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. J. Wood, Gen. Stanley having been wounded at Franklin, was composed of three divisions commanded respectively by Brig.-Gens. Nathan Kimball W. L. Elliott and Samuel Beatty; the 23rd corps, under Maj.-Gen. John M. Schofield, consisted of two divisions, the 2nd commanded by Maj.-Gen. D. N. Couch and the 3rd by Brig.-Gen. J. D. Cox; (the 1st division of this corps was absent on detached duty); three divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, (Maj.-Gen. A. J. Smith's command) the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. John McArthur, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. Kenner Garrard, and the 3rd by Col. J. B. Moore, the provisional detachment of Maj.-Gen. J. B. Steedman, consisting of one division under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft; the post of Nashville, troops of the 20th corps, under command of Brig.-Gen. John F. Miller; the quartermaster's division, commanded by Bvt. Brig.-Gen. J. L. Donaldson, the cavalry corps under command of Bvt. Maj.-Gen. J. H. Wilson, consisting of Croxton's brigade of the 1st division, the 5th division commanded by Brig.-Gen. Edward Hatch, the 6th division under command of Brig.-Gen. R. W. Johnson, and the 7th division under Brig-Gen. J. F. Knipe. With this force of infantry and cavalry were 40 batteries of light artillery. Hood's army was organized as follows: Lee's corps, Lieut.-Gen. S. D. Lee, was com- posed of the divisions of Johnson, Stevenson and Clayton; Stewart's corps, Lieut.-Gen. A. P. Stewart, consisted of the divisions of Loring, French and Walthall; Cheatham's corps, Lieut.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham, included the infantry divisions of Cleburne and Bate, and the cavalry division of Gen. J. R Chalmers. Gen. Cleburne was killed at the battle of Franklin and his division was commanded at Nashville by Brig.-Gen. J. A. Smith. The strength of Hood's army has been variously estimated at from 30,000 to 39,000 men of all arms. Col. Stone, who went into the subject somewhat exhaustively, fixes it at 37,937.
Nashville is situated on the south side of the Cumberland river. In December, 1864, several turnpike roads radiated from the city between the southeast and southwest, all running through a country somewhat broken. Six miles due south are the Brentwood hills, along the east side of which ran the Franklin pike, while the Hillsboro pike ran along the western base. Two creeks rise in these hills, their sources being less than a mile apart. Brown's creek flows northeast, emptying into the Cumberland above the city, and Richland creek flows northwest into the river some distance below. Along the ridge between the two streams ran the Granny White pike. The Nolensville pike entered the cite from the southeast, crossing Brown's creek not far from the Chattanooga railroad, while north of the railroad, and between it and the river, ran the Murfreesboro, Chicken and Lebanon pikes. Another range of hills near the city had been fortified by order of Thomas. Hood followed Schofield from Franklin and during the afternoon of Dec. 2, his cavalry engaged the Union skirmishers in front of Nashville. The next day the whole Confederate force appeared, the Federal skirmishers were crowded back, and Hood proceeded to form his main line on the hills immediately south of the Union fortifications. The morning of the 4th found his salient on Montgomery hill, within 600 yards of the Union works. Cheatham's corps on the right occupied a position behind Brown's creek, extending from the railroad to the Franklin pike, Stewart's corps formed the center and lay across the Granny White pike, while Smith's corps on the left extended the line to the Hillsboro pike. From there to the river below, across the Hardin and Charlotte pikes, and from Cheatham's right to the river above the cavalry was posted. Having taken. this position Hood did not attack the works in front of the city, but spent several days in reducing some of the smaller outlying garrisons and blockhouses along the railroad. This gave Thomas time to complete his preparations, to mount and equip his cavalry and thoroughly organize his troops. Gen. Grant in Virginia and the authorities at Washington grew impatient at the delay, fearing that Hood would eventually elude Thomas' pass round Nashville, and invade Kentucky as Bragg had done in the summer of 1862. But Thomas was guarding the fords and bridges with his cavalry, and the gunboats of Fitch's squadron were patrolling the river above and below the city. Gen. Lyon, with a detachment of Con- federate cavalry, did succeed in crossing at Clarksville on the 9th with a view to destroying the Louisville & Nashville rail- road, but Thomas dispatched Gen. E. M. McCook, with two brigades of the 1st cavalry division, to look after Lyon, so that the latter's expedition proved fruitless.
Grant, however, was of the opinion that Thomas should have given battle before the enemy had time to recover from the blow received at Franklin, and on Dec. 2, he telegraphed Thomas to leave the defenses of Nashville to Donaldson's division and at-tack Hood at once. Although this telegram was not an official order, its language was scarcely less imperative, but Thomas was so anxious to increase his force of cavalry, and so certain that he could do so within a few days, he decided to wait until he could attack with every assurance of success. In reply to Grant's telegrams Thomas said: ''I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more cavalry, and will take the field anyhow as soon as the remainder of Gen. McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which I hope will be in two or three days. We can get neither reinforcements nor equipments at this great distance from the North very easily, and it must be remembered that my command was made up of the two weakest corps of Gen. Sherman's army, and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade, and the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with many delays, which have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however, in a few more days I shall be able to give him a fight.'' This explanation was evidently not satisfactory, either to Grant or to Sec. of War Stanton, and Thomas was again urged to attack the enemy in his front. It was a case of the man at the desk a thousand miles away trying to direct the operations of the man in the field. The record of Thomas at Mill Springs and Chickamauga ought to have been a sufficient guarantee of his ability to command an army or to plan a campaign, yet that record availed him nothing now, when the secretary of war and the lieutenant-general of the Federal armies were ''spoiling for a fight.'' On the 6th Grant sent another telegram to Thomas, directing him to attack at once, and to wait no longer to remount his cavalry. To this Thomas replied that he would make the necessary disposition and attack, ''agreeably to your orders, though I believe it will be hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my command.'' This elicited a sarcastic telegram from Stanton to Grant, in which he said: ''Thomas seems unwilling to attack be-cause it is hazardous, as if all war was any but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last horn.''
To such sneers as this the hero of Chickamauga paid no attention but went quietly ahead completing his arrangements for a battle that was to forever destroy the usefulness of Hood's army as a factor in the War of the Rebellion. By the 9th he was ready to attack, but a severe storm came on, covering the ground with a thick coating of sleet, over which it was impossible to move troops with that celerity so essential to success in making an assault on an enemy. On the 9th Gen. Halleck telegraphed him as follows: ''Lieut.-Gen. Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy.'' To this Thomas replied: ''I feel conscious I have done everything in my power, and that the troops could not have been gotten ready be-fore this. If Gen. Grant should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur.'' He seems to have had a premonition of what was about to occur, for on the same day Grant asked the war department to relieve Thomas and turn over the command of the army at Nashville to Schofield. When notice of this order was received at Nashville, Thomas called a council of his corps commanders and asked their advice, informing them that he was ordered to give battle immediately or surrender his command. The council was unanimous in the opinion that it was impracticable to make any attack until the ice should melt. The order relieving Thomas was then suspended, but on the 13th Grant again became impatient and ordered Gen. Logan to proceed at once to Nashville, and the next day started for that place himself to assume command of the army in person.
By noon on the 14th the ice had melted sufficiently to permit the movement of troops. At 3 p.m. Thomas called together his corps commanders and laid before them his plan of battle for the following morning. Steedman was to make a feint against the enemy's right, while Smith, with the three divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, was to form his troops on the Hardin pike and make a vigorous assault on Hood's left. In this movement Smith was to be supported by Wilson, with three divisions of cavalry, and one division of cavalry was to be sent out on the Charlotte pike to clear that road of the enemy and keep watch on Bell's landing. Wood was directed to leave a strong skirmish line in his works from Lawrens' hill to his right, form the remainder of the 4th corps on the Hillsboro road to support Smith's left, and at the same time move against the left and rear of the salient on Montgomery hilt Schofield, after leaving a strong line of skirmishers in the trenches from Lawrens' hill to Fort Negley, was to move with the rest of the 23rd corps and cooperate with Wood, protecting his left against any attack by the enemy. The troops under Donaldson, Miller and Cruft were to occupy the inner line of works and guard the approaches to the city. At 4 a.m. on the 15th everyone within the Federal works was awake and at daylight the several commands began to move to their assigned positions. A dense fog hung over the field during the early morning hours, completely concealing the movements of the Federal troops. Each officer seemed to feel the injustice of the imputation cast on Thomas, and all now moved as if determined to vindicate the valor of the Army of the Cumberland and the honor and judgment of its commander. At 6 o'clock Steedman moved out on the Murfreesboro pike and 2 hours later began his demonstration against Cheat-ham's right. This demonstration was so vigorous that it was virtually an assault. The roar of his artillery and the rapid fire of his musketry soon drew Hood's attention to that part of his line. Reinforcements were hurried to Cheatham and Steedman withdrew his men after they had carried part of the enemy's entrenchments, as they were subjected to an enfilading fire and the object of the feint had been gained, though toward noon Col. Thompson, with three regiments of colored troops assaulted and carried the left of the front line of Confederate works on the Nolensville pike, holding his position there until the next morning. Smith had to move farther than anticipated, and the movements of his men were retarded by the fog and mud, so that it was 10 o'clock before he reached the first of the detached redoubts which Hood had built between his left flank and the river. This was between the Hardin and Hillsboro roads and was manned by a detachment of Walthall's infantry, with 4 pieces of artillery. Hatch and McArthur opened fire on it with their batteries, Coon's cavalry brigade dismounted and charged, carrying the redoubt and capturing the guns. At the same time McArthur charged from another direction and as the enemy was retiring captured 15O prisoners. The captured redoubt was under the fire of another and stronger one, and the two commands now turned their attention to its reduction. Again Coon's brigade, armed with repeating rifles, advanced up the hill, firing as they went, while McArthur was in such close support that the Confederates saw they were doomed to defeat and made the at-tempt to abandon the redoubt. Just then McArthur ordered a charge, which was successfully made, and 250 prisoners were added to those already taken. In the meantime Hatch had engaged a portion of French's division near Richland creek and driven it back beyond the Hardin house, where Col. Spaulding, with the 12th Tenn. cavalry made a brilliant charge, capturing 43 prisoners and the headquarters train of Chalmers' division.
As soon as Wood heard the sound of Smith's guns, he moved against Montgomery hill, swinging to the left as he advanced in an effort to uncover the enemy's flank. At 1 p. m. Post's bri-gade of Beatty's division dashed up the hill and over the entrenchments. He was promptly supported by the rest of the division, and the enemy's salient was in possession of the Federals. Wood then threw his reserve brigade of each division to his right and engaged the enemy with his entire corps. This movement of the 4th corps to the right caused Thomas to order Schofield to the right of Smith. In executing this movement Couch's division pushed beyond the second captured redoubt and carried the enemy's line on a range of hills parallel to the Granny White pike. Cox's division moved still farther to the right, driving the Confederates from the hills along Richland creek. As Schofield was thus moving to the right Smith bore to the left, assaulted Walthall's division behind a stone wall near the Hillsboro road driving Reynolds' brigade on the left in confusion and finally routed the entire division. At sunset the whole Confederate army had been driven from its original line and forced back to the Brentwood hills. During the night Hood formed a new line with his right resting on Overton's hill near the Franklin pike and extending from there along the base of the Brentwood hills, his left being refused a little west of the Granny White pike. The Union forces bivouacked on the field, and Thomas gave orders for each corps to move forward at 6 o'clock the next morning, not halting until the enemy should be met. If Hood showed a disposition to accept battle a general attack was to be made, but if he should retreat the whole army was to be pushed forward in pursuit.
The battle on the 16th was opened by the advance of the 4th corps on the Franklin pike. The enemy's skirmishers were driven back and Wood pressed forward to the main line of works on Overton's hill. Steedman came up on the Nolensville road and formed on Wood's left, while Smith connected with Wood's right, forming a continuous line of battle. Schofield occupied a position facing east, perpendicular to Smith's line, and Wilson, on the right of Schofield, was directed to gain the enemy's rear with his cavalry. By noon Wilson had reached the rear and stretched his line across the Granny White pike. Thomas then ordered an assault on Overton's hill, in the hope of gaining the Franklin road, thereby cutting off the last avenue of retreat. Morgan's brigade of Steedman's command, with the left brigades of the 4th corps, moved forward to the assault, advancing in the face of a heavy fire of infantry and artillery until near the crest, when a line of reserves arose and opened such a destructive fire that the column was compelled to fall back. The heaviest losses sustained by the Union army was in this attack on Overton's hill. Immediately following Wood's repulse here Smith and Schofield moved against the enemy's works in their front, carried everything before them broke the line in a dozen places, captured all the artillery and several thousand prisoners. At the same time Wilson attacked the enemy in the rear, clinching his possession of the Granny White pike and completely shutting off retreat by that road. Wood and Steedman, hearing the shouts of victory on their right, now made another assault on Overton's hill, and although they were met by the same heavy fire as before, the onset was irresistible. As the Federal lines advanced the enemy broke in confusion, leaving all his artillery and many prisoners in the hands of the victorious assailants. On through Brentwood pass the Confederates fled, a disorganized mob, closely pursued by the 4th corps for several miles, or until darkness put an end to the chase for that day. The pursuit was continued for ten days, but owing to the delays encountered in crossing Ruther-ford's creek and Duck river, both swollen by recent rains and the bridges destroyed, Hood got so far in advance that he crossed the Tennessee river at Bainbridge on the 26th and the chase was abandoned.
The Union loss in the battle of Nashville was 387 killed, 2,562 wounded, and 112 missing. No detailed report of the Con-federate losses was made Hood reached Tupelo, Miss., with about 21,OOO men. In his report of the campaign he says: ''The official records will show that my losses including prisoners, during the entire campaign do not exceed 10,000 men.'' On the other hand Thomas officially reports the capture of 13,189 prisoners, and it is known that the Confederate loss in killed and wounded at the battle of Franklin alone was about 5,000 to say nothing of Nashville and the other engagements of the campaign. In addition to the prisoners reported by Thomas, the Union army captured 72 pieces of artillery, and a large number of battle-flags. Notwithstanding Grant's severe criticisms of Thomas' delay, he sent a telegram congratulating him on his victory, and Sec. Stanton ordered a salute of 100 guns to be fired on the 16th to celebrate the event. Gen. Cullum, in speaking of the battle of Nashville, says: ''The best tactical battle of the war, so decisive in results, was the last and crowning glory of Thomas' campaigns; but it sufficed to stamp him as one of the foremost soldiers of the great civil contest a general who had never been defeated, and one whose victories had placed him among the greatest heroes of the Republic.''
Source: The Union Army, vol. 6
Brigade, Division, Corps, and Army assignments for
16th Illinois Cavalry RegimentFrom
To
Brigade
Division
Corps
Army/Department
Comments
Mar 1 1863
Jun 30 1863
4th Separate
8
Middle Department
Co. C
Jun 1 1863
Dec 31 1863
Averell's 4th Separate
Department of West Virginia
Co. C
Sep 1863
Oct 1863
Cumberland Gap
Left Wing, East TN
Army and Dept of Ohio
New Organization
Dec 1 1863
Apr 30 1864
2
4
Department of West Virginia
Co. C
Jan 11 1864
Apr 17 1864
District of the Clinch
Left Wing, East TN
Army and Dept of Ohio
Apr 1864
Apr 10 1864
3
1
Cavalry
Army and Dept of Ohio
Apr 1 1864
Jul 31 1864
Harper's Ferry: West SH
Reserve
Department of West Virginia
Co. C
Apr 10 1864
Jun 28 1864
2
Cavalry
District of Kentucky
Army and Dept of Ohio
May 1 1864
Jun 28 1864
1
Cavalry
Army and Dept of Ohio
Jun 21 1864
Aug 22 1864
Cavalry
23
Army and Dept of Ohio
ug 11 1864
Sep 19 1864
Dismounted
Cavalry
Army and Dept of Ohio
Sep 19 1864
Nov 1 1864
1
Cavalry
Army and Dept of Ohio
Nov 17 1864
Aug 1865
1
6
Cavalry
Military Division of the Mississippi
Mustered Out